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THE INFLUENCE OF JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF U.S.-JAPANESE BILATERAL GROUND EXERCISES

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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B.S., United States Military Academy, 1977
M.A., Indiana University of Pennsylvania, 1986

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The evolution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises has been characterized by progressive development but also by continual opposition from various segments of Japanese society and government. While many factors have influenced the evolution of bilateral ground exercises, two factors-- Japanese public opinion and government policy-- have played a particularly important role. The historical effects that Japanese public opinion and government policy have had on the evolution of Japanese defense policy and military cooperation with the United States served as a basis for this investigation. This study concludes that, to a considerable degree, negative Japanese public opinion and corresponding local government recalcitrance, government policy, pacifism, the news media, special interest groups, and the political opposition have shaped and continue to influence the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises. These influences threaten U.S. Army-JGSDF capabilities to fight bilaterally in a future conflict. Among the most significant consequences of this influence are inefficient, unrealistic training exercises, the lack of a unified command and control system, and the inability of bilateral forces to train on the specific ground they would fight on.

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

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

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE INFLUENCE OF JAPANESE PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF U.S.-JAPANESE BILATERAL GROUND EXERCISES, by Major Donald J. McGhee, USA, 136 pages.

The evolution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises has been characterized by progressive development but also by continual opposition from various segments of Japanese society and government. While many factors have influenced the evolution of bilateral ground exercises, two factors--Japanese public opinion and government policy--have played a particularly important role.

The historical effects that Japanese public opinion and government policy have had on the evolution of Japanese defense policy and military cooperation with the United States served as a basis for this investigation.

This study concludes that, to a considerable degree, negative Japanese public opinion and corresponding local government recalcitrance, government policy, pacifism, the news media, special interest groups, and the political opposition have shaped and continue to influence the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises. These influences threaten U.S. Army-JGSDF capabilities to fight bilaterally in a future conflict. Among the most significant consequences of this influence are inefficient, unrealistic training exercises, the lack of a unified command and control system, and the inability of bilateral forces to train on the specific ground they would fight on.

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CONTENTS

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE.....ii

ABSTRACT.....iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....iv

ILLUSTRATIONS.....vi

CHAPTER ONE. Introduction.....1

CHAPTER TWO. Japan's Defense Policy and Public Opinion.....11

CHAPTER THREE. The Origins and Evolution of the JGSDF and U.S.-Japanese Bilateral Ground Exercises.....38

CHAPTER FOUR. The Influence of Public Opinion and Government Policy on the Planning and Execution of Bilateral Ground Exercises....61

CHAPTER FIVE. Conclusion.....90

APPENDIX A. Review of the Literature.....100

APPENDIX B. Research Methodology.....112

BIBLIOGRAPHY.....125

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST.....136

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

1. Japanese Support for the SDF.....23
2. Japanese Attitudes on the Mutual Security Treaty.....24
3. Japanese Attitudes on Defense.....27
4. Defense Agency Organization.....43
5. Major JGSDF Organizations.....46
6. Historical Summary of Bilateral Ground Exercises.....51
7. Bilateral Exercise Relationship.....63
8. Major JGSDF Training Areas.....66
9. U.S. Army II.4.b. Approved Training Areas.....69
10. The II.4.b. Approval Procedure.....70

Maps

1. Map of Japan.....7
2. JGSDF Army Geographic Locations.....47
3. Japanese Training Areas.....55

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

> Today the Japanese Armed Forces throughout Japan completed their demobilization and ceased to exist as such. These forces are now completely abolished. This ends its military might and its military influence in international affairs. It no longer reckons as a world power either large or small. Its path in the future, if it is to survive, must be confined to the ways of peace.[1]

General Douglas MacArthur's proclamation on 16 October 1945 hailed the end of Japanese World War II military power. Implicit in MacArthur's statement is the United States' intention to restrain the reemergence to power of Japan's imperial military force. Wanton imperial militarism had been a catalyst for Japan's colonial expansionism that contributed to the origins of World War II conflict with the United States.

As the decade of the 1980s ends, the United States ironically finds itself relying on, and in many cases demanding, increased Japanese defense spending. The Japanese have been urged to assume a greater role in sharing the defense burden. An integral element of Japan's increased defensive cooperation has been their participation in bilateral military exercises with the United States military. All U.S. services conduct bilateral exercises

with their JSDF (Japanese Self-Defense Force) counterparts. However, this paper will concentrate on the nature and evolution of bilateral exercises between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF (Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force).

Japan's evolution from a post-World War II sovereign nation with no capacity to provide for its own self-defense to one with mutual security treaties and bilateral military commitments is remarkable. Competing political interests as well as moral and legal implications complicate this multifaceted situation. While many factors have influenced the evolution of bilateral exercises, two factors--public opinion and government policies--have played a particularly important role.

The evolution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises has been characterized by progressive development, but also by constant opposition to that development. While bilateral cooperation between the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force has developed during the past ten years (1979-89) and grown in both size and scope, there has also been continual opposition from various segments of Japanese society and government.

With these considerations in mind, the thesis of this paper will endeavor to demonstrate that, to a considerable degree, Japanese public opinion and government policy have shaped the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises in a number of significant ways

that might seriously affect JGSDF-U.S. Army capabilities to fight bilaterally in a future conflict. An overview of the historical effects that Japanese public opinion and government policy have had on the evolution of Japanese defense policy and military cooperation with the United States will serve as a basis for this investigation.

* Background Information

Japan is one of our strongest allies in northeast Asia. U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises serve to strengthen the bonds of military cooperation and interoperability between the U.S. Army and the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force. If U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises are to be conducted with maximum efficiency to achieve their goals, the U.S. Army should be aware of the limitations placed on these exercises by Japanese public opinion and governmental actions and pressures.

---

* From August 1986 through January 1989, I was assigned to DCSOPS (the deputy chief of staff for operations), Exercise Division, USARJ/IX Corps (United States Army Japan and IX Corps). As a project officer for U.S.-Japanese bilateral FTXs (field training exercises), a large percentage of my duties involved coordination with the JGSDF on all facets of bilateral exercise planning and execution. My awareness of the ramifications of Japanese public opinion and government policy on U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises stems from this coordination.

Thesis Purpose

In the process of supporting my thesis, I will endeavor to achieve three objectives. First, I will provide a brief historical analysis of Japan's domestic dilemma with defense issues and public opinion--a conflict which has directly influenced U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercise cooperation.

Second, I wish to educate readers on the evolution of the JGSDF, U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation, and the scope and importance of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises.

Finally, in order to support the fundamental elements of my thesis, I will analyze and discuss the consequences of Japanese public opinion and government policy on the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises. This analysis will reveal limitations and restrictions that inhibit bilateral military training, and in some cases would seriously affect the ability of U.S. and Japanese ground forces to effectively fight on the same battlefield.

Assumptions

Some of the assumptions that underlay my study are that the Japanese government will continue to support U.S.-

Japanese bilateral exercises; the U.S. government will continue to fund U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises; and the U.S. and Japan will continue to abide by the provisions of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty.

Definition of Terms

1. Public opinion, as referred to in this work, denotes the surveyed attitudes of random samples from the average Japanese population and the views of intellectuals and special interest groups. The Japanese government, as well as private institutions, conduct many surveys relating to defense issues. Chapter two includes an expanded discussion of public opinion polls and evidence concerning their relevancy and accuracy.

2. The term government policies as used herein signifies directives or guidelines (stated as well as implied) that directly or indirectly affect the scope and breadth of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises.

3. Bilateral exercises, unless noted otherwise, refer to combined U.S. Army and JGSDF field training exercises. These exercises, although predominantly ground oriented, incorporate some U.S. Air Force and Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (Japanese equivalent of the U.S. Air Force) joint operations. Unlike joint operations, as defined in The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercise joint operations do not fall under a

single, overall commander.[2] In fact, U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground operations, in addition to joint operations, have separate and distinct command relationships. This structure, as well as a more detailed explanation of bilateral exercises, is examined in chapters three and four.

4. Orient Shield refers to an annual brigade-size (approximately 4,000 U.S. and Japanese participants) exercise. The largest bilateral FTX (field training exercise) conducted between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF, this exercise takes place in October through November. Orient Shield is conducted in Japan on a rotational basis with one of the five regional Japanese armies.[3]

5. North Wind is an annual cold weather winter warfare FTX that takes place in northern Honshu or Hokkaido during February and March (see map 1). North Wind is a battalion-size (approximately 450 U.S. and 450 Japanese participants) exercise.

Delimitations

U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises continue to evolve. A historical summary of bilateral exercises is limited here to U.S.-Japanese bilateral FTXs during the period September 1982 through March 1990. The information I have acquired to provide me with a baseline knowledge of the

MAP 1


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evolution of Japanese Defense Policy focused on major defense-policy agreements and issues. The baseline documents supporting my research are the "Basic Policy of National Defense," adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Cabinet in May 1957, and the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America."[4]

The complex issues inherent in Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution will be treated only as they relate to the relationship and influence Article 9 has had on bilateral U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation. The equally complex issue of the JGSDF's nature and role in Japan's overall security is similarly limited to those aspects which paralleled or affected the U.S.-Japanese exercise relationship.

Surveys are analyzed in this work to extrapolate Japanese attitudes on bilateral exercises from the larger issues of U.S.-Japanese Security cooperation and Japanese defense policy. Analysis of survey data is limited primarily to the period 1967 through 1988.

Significance of the Study

The goal of this thesis is that it may serve as a vehicle to increase U.S. Army awareness of both the role U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises play in U.S.-Japanese

defense cooperation as well as the limitations and restrictions imposed on these exercises by Japanese public opinion and government policy. If U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises are to be improved, externally imposed limitations and restrictions on these exercises should be identified and the negative effects they have on interoperability should be determined.

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Douglas MacArthur, A Soldier Speaks (New York: Praeger, 1965), 155.

2. United States Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Officers Guide (1988):320.

3. The U.S. Army has conducted bilateral training exercise with all five JGSDF armies.

4. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan, translated by The Japan Times (Tokyo, 1989), 85. Several of these annual "White Papers" provided information for this thesis. Hereafter they will be cited as DOJ (year), pages.

CHAPTER 2

JAPAN'S DEFENSE POLICY AND PUBLIC OPINION

While many factors have affected the formulation of post-World War II Japanese defense policy, public opinion has been particularly influential. Public opinion has played a key role in shaping Japanese defense policy options and in many instances has restrained military growth. This chapter will investigate the relationship between Japanese public opinion and post-World War II Japanese defense policy. It will examine specifically the attitudes of the general public, special interest groups, governmental political organizations, and the mass media as they relate to defense issues. In the process, the interrelationship between public opinion, government policy, and U.S.-Japanese bilateral military cooperation should be illuminated.

Japanese public opinion serves as a catalyst in generating public policy. Emmerson and Humphreys write:

> No [Japanese] prime minister can afford to ignore public opinion, especially as it is manifested in the elected parliament and through such power groups as the bureaucracy, business, special interests and the highly developed mass media.[1]

In Japanese society, public opinion polls are frequently used and carefully monitored by political parties. For instance, the public relations division of the prime minister's office reported receiving 555 opinion surveys from April 1970 through 31 March 1971. Forty seven surveys were conducted by national government agencies, 92 by prefectural bodies, 210 by municipal institutions, and 75 by newspaper publishers.[2] Akio Watanabe, a frequent writer on public opinion in Japan, states that

> the existence of numerous public opinion surveys on a certain matter is some proof that society generally considers that problem important, hence policy-makers cannot completely ignore it. Thus, the collective opinions of Japanese voters, as manifested in these opinion polls, exert some influence on the thoughts and actions of policy-makers.[3]

Consequently, public opinion has assumed a prominent role in shaping post-World War II Japanese attitudes on defense issues.

Post-World War II Japanese Defense Attitudes

In general, four major characteristics have defined Japanese perspectives on defense during the last forty-five years: Japan's pacifism; the primacy of Japan's economic expansionism; Japan's perceived absence of external military threats; and Japan's reliance on the United States for its

defense.[4] Each of these attitudes will be addressed in more detail.

The Japanese Constitution

Japan's pacifism is founded on its post-World War II constitution, a document greatly influenced by the United States, a central collaborator in the evolution of Japan's defense policy. Article 9 of the constitution exemplifies the essence of Japanese pacifism. This article, commonly referred to as the "peace clause," states:

> Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
>
> In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.[5]

The unique nature of Article 9--its declaration that Japan shall not possess land, sea, and air forces--has precipitated formidable defense-related problems. The idealism embodied in Article 9 has imbued all matters of defense with a peculiarly moral cast.[6] As a result, it has been difficult for Japan to develop a defense policy and to establish and train a viable military force, while at the same time surmounting the political and legal difficulties posed by the passivism inherent in Article 9.

Article 9 was incorporated in the constitution to prevent Japan from restoring its old emphasis on military aggression. General Douglas Macarthur wished to effect a spiritual change in Japan that fostered peace, rather than war. Unfortunately, strictly interpreted, Article 9 left Japan defenseless and unable to establish forces to protect its own sovereignty. When tensions in Korea forced U.S. occupation troops out of Japan in 1950, it necessitated the formation of Japanese forces to protect the Japanese homeland. The United States realized that a change in the official interpretation of Article 9 was needed in order to execute this policy.

General MacArthur, at whose insistence Article 9 was added to the constitution, indicated the need for a new interpretation in his 1950 New Year's Day message by stating that ". . . by no `sophistry of reasoning' could [Article 9] be interpreted `as complete negation' of the inalienable right of [Japanese] self-defense against unprovoked attack."[7] Prime Minister Yoshida reinforced this interpretation on 23 January 1950 with a similar pronouncement.[8] Japan, under constant pressure from the United States, has increased its defensive commitments. (An example is Japan's recent agreement to extend and protect its SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication) out to 1,000 nautical miles). However, the impact of Article 9 on the Japanese conscience is still pronounced.

For example, in response to an incident in the Diet in March 1967 (the Keitei incident), Prime Minister Sato was forced to once again clarify the government's view on the legality of the Self-Defense Forces by saying: ". . . it has been the consistent view of the government's interpretation of the constitutional theory that the existence of the self-defense force is not a violation of the Constitution."[9] Even the 1988 edition of The Defense of Japan feels obligated to discuss Article 9 and its impact on defense issues. The JDA (Japanese Defense Agency) states that the constitution upholds pacifism and requires (in Article 9) the renunciation of war, the nonpossession of war potential, and the denial of the right of belligerency of the state. At the same time, the JDA maintains that as long as Japan is a sovereign state, "it is recognized beyond doubt that the provision in the article does not deny the inherent right of self-defense that Japan is entitled to maintain as a sovereign nation."[10] But while members of the defense community believe in the nation's right to inherent self-defense, this attitude, as we shall see latter, is not universally accepted among many of the Japanese people. Thus, debate on the constitutionality of the Self-Defense Forces continues. In fact, in 1973, a Japanese district court declared the Self-Defense Force unconstitutional.[11] This impasse has had a profound effect on the Japanese government's approach to defense development. In his

article, "Japanese Security and Post-War Foreign Policy," D. C. Hellman asserts:

> Since the very legality of the military forces has been vehemently questioned by a portion of the Left, it is not surprising that it has proved difficult for the government to articulate clear and positive national strategic objectives.[12]

Economic Expansionism

Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida first espoused the primacy of economic expansion over military rearmament in the early 1950s. The Yoshida Doctrine, as it is now commonly referred to, emphasized maximum Japanese economic development while at the same time minimizing Japanese military growth and international political involvement.[13] In fact, Yoshida diverted from Japan's economic recovery to military development only those funds that would continue to ensure U.S. economic support and security cooperation.[14]

The Japanese public has embraced the primacy of economic expansionism over military development and is very reluctant to acquiesce to government gestures to increase defense spending. An example is the negative Japanese public reaction to government attempts to increase defense spending above 1 percent of the GNP (gross national product). In this case, an earlier defense policy that had widespread public approval (limiting defense spending to 1 percent of the GNP) was exceedingly difficult for the government to change.

In reality, the 1 percent rule was never an officially legislated rule or law. The policy of keeping defense-related expenditures within 1 percent of the gross national product began with the Miki cabinet in 1976.[15]

The 1 percent rule conformed to the generally accepted public consensus that 1 percent was an acceptable level of defense expenditures. However, the costs of military modernization placed pressures on the 1 percent defense-spending limit. The Defense Agency was faced with the dilemma of not meeting its modernization goals or being forced to ask the government to exceed the 1 percent GNP limit on defense expenditures. Government overtures to raise the 1 percent cap on defense spending met with expected dissatisfaction by opposition political parties. It also aroused even more than expected negative public reaction. Consequently, the 1 percent rule became a rallying cry for left-wing antimilitary factions. These factions were, in turn, able to mobilize public sentiment to their cause. Because of negative public attitudes toward lifting the 1 percent limit on defense spending, it took intense political maneuver and debate to surmount the problem. In the process, the fundamental issue became whether or not to allow military spending to exceed 1 percent of the GNP. What was lost sight of was, as Taketsugu Tsurutani suggests, "the specific security needs that Japan, as [a] sovereign state and as a partner of the

U.S. under the existing security pact should meet."[16] The 1 percent of GNP ceiling on defense spending, although an unwritten policy, had become, as Atsushi Odawara explains in his 1985 Japan Quarterly article, "No Tampering With the Brakes on Military Expansion"--not just a cabinet decision but a broadly sanctioned public policy.[17]

However, under the strong leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone and pressures from the United States, a 24 January 1987 cabinet decree removed the 1 percent GNP defense ceiling.[18] Thus, in 1988, Japan increased defense spending to 1.01 percent of its GNP.[19] (Because of a higher than expected economic growth rate, however, revised FY 89 defense expenditures were actually less than 1 percent of the GNP.) According to Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of Defense James E. Auer, Prime Minister Nakasone

> understood geopolitics, and probed to discover how far Japanese postwar taboos could be modified to find an appropriate defense role for Japan within the confines of its constitution and domestic political reality.[20]

While ultimately successful in the short term, Prime Minister Nakasone paid a political price for his actions in the unfavorable public opinion and backlash he received over his decision to rescind the 1 percent GNP policy. A 1987 Asahi Shimbun poll disclosed that 15 percent of the respondents wished to remove the 1 percent ceiling, while 61 percent approved of it.[21]

The Absence of External Threats

The perception by the Japanese that they lack a viable threat to their security has caused ambiguity in their defense policies. In a 1983 article for the Naval War College Review, "Japanese Attitudes Towards Defense and Security Issues", L. Niksch writes that while public opinion polls rank the Soviet Union as the most likely threat to Japanese security, a Soviet attack runs fairly low among possible dangers.[22] Other authors echo this viewpoint, among them Makato Momoi. He writes:

> Both the official denial of the presence of potential enemies and the absence of any sense of threat among the general public--at least the threat of an immediate and large-scale attack--have inevitably led to ambiguous defense policies.[23]

It is interesting to note, however, that while Momoi asserts official denial of the presence of potential enemies, the JDA has used the threat of Soviet expansionism in northeast Asia during the 1980s as an argument for increased defense vigilance. For instance, the forward to the 1990 Defense of Japan white paper states:

> It is true that the Soviet Union has announced a reduction of its military forces also in the areas around Japan. But the reality is that the Soviet forces in the Far East still maintain formidable military capabilities accumulated in the past, and that they are even now pushing ahead with their modernization.[24]

Japan's Reliance on the United States for Defense

Japan has relied on U.S. security, in varying degrees, since World War II. The United States demilitarization of Japan immediately following World War II necessitated Japan's complete reliance on U.S. military protection. The U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, while dictating increased Japanese responsibility to provide for its own defense, provided specific U.S. guarantees to come to Japan's aid in case of external aggression. As stated earlier, Japan has assumed greater responsibility for defense of her ALOCs (Air Lines of Communication) and SLOCs. Nevertheless, Japan continues to rely on the United States strategic nuclear deterrent and conventional reinforcement if attacked by a potent aggressor.

Japanese Defense Policy and Public Support

Two documents established Japan's defense policy: the Treaty of Security Between Japan and the United States of America, effective April 1952, and the Basic Policy for National Defense, adopted by the National Defense Council and approved by the Japanese Cabinet in May 1957.[25] In January 1960, a new treaty was signed--the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America (hereafter referred to as the Mutual Security Treaty).[26]

The basic policy for national defense as outlined in the 1988 edition of The Defense of Japan defines the objective of national defense as follows:

> . . . to prevent direct and indirect aggression, but once invaded, to repel such aggression, thereby preserving the independence and peace of Japan founded upon democratic principles.[27]

To accomplish national defense objectives, The Defense of Japan establishes the following four principles:

> 1. To support the activities of the United Nations, and promote international cooperation, thereby contributing to the realization of world peace.
>
> 2. To promote public welfare and enhance the people's love for the country, thereby establishing the sound basis essential to Japan's security.
>
> 3. To develop progressively the effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense, with regard to the nation's resources and the prevailing domestic situation.
>
> 4. To deal with external aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, pending the effective functioning of the United Nations in the future in deterring and repelling such aggression.[28]

Principles number two and three confirm the importance the Japanese Defense Agency places on public support for defense policy and the development of a viable JSDF. Principle two recognizes the need to build a consensus among the populace that supports the JSDF. The two principles together acknowledge Japan's need to increase self-defense within the constraints of domestic public opinion and the nation's resources. The Japanese defense establishment understands that it is essential to enhance the people's love of country in order to gain popular support for defense issues and to

establish a sound basis for defense. The 1988 edition of DOJ further states:

> National consensus in regard to the nation's security policies is the foundation for the maintenance of the country's peace and security. No national defense can be accomplished without the understanding and support of the people, and their will to defend their country.[29]

Other elements of the Japanese government also recognize the importance public support plays in defense-related issues.

Public Opinion

There have been numerous public opinion polls conducted to survey Japanese attitudes on defense issues in general and the SDF in particular. The scope of this thesis dictates a more general, rather than detailed, explanation of all the different polls. Figure 1 depicts a good synopsis of public support for the SDF. This information, from an article by Douglas H. Mendel, demonstrates that support for the SDF has generally increased in the years 1956 through 1972.[30] This support continued to rise in the late 1970s to 80-89 percent.[31] However, the increased support for the existence of the SDF does not signify increased support for defense spending, an increase in the SDF structure, or the primary focus of this thesis--support for U.S.-Japanese bilateral field-training exercises.

An analysis of Japanese attitudes toward the Mutual Security Treaty offers additional insights. Figure 2

FIGURE 1

SUPPORT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SELF DEFENSE FORCES*

"Do you think it is good to possess self-defense forces or not to have them?

	1956	1959	1963	1969	1972
Favor	58	65	77	75	73
Oppose	19	11	8	10	12
Other, don't know	23	24	15	15	15

Demographic variations of the 1972 sample:

	Favor	Oppose
Males	74	15
Females	72	9
Liberal Democrats	88	3
Socialists	63	24
Communists	37	57
Komeito	62	18

* The first 10 years (1956-65) of the survey used a population sample size of 20,000 The 1972 survey used a population sample size of 3,000.

SOURCE: Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., "The Modern Japanese Military System," in The Modern Japanese Military System, edited by James H. Buck (London: Sage, 1975), 163.

FIGURE 2

RESULTS OF SURVEYS ON JAPANESE OPINION REGARDING THE MUTUAL SECURITY TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES
(By percentage of response)

1. Do you think the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is useful for the maintenance of peace and the security of Japan?

	Yes, very useful. Yes, think so.	No, don't think so. No, even harmful.	Don't know. Other.
Dec 1967	54	17	29
Dec 1969	62	20	19

2. Do you think the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is useful for the purpose of maintaining Japan's security?

	Very useful.	Maybe useful.	Not very useful, even harmful.	Undecided, don't know, other.
Mar 1968	12	33	21	34
Apr 1968	12	43	17	28
Jun 1969	12	35	6	46

3. Is the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in the interests of Japan?

	Yes, it is.	No, it isn't.	Undecided.	No Answer.
Jan 1969	33	29	--	40
Sep 1969	37	34	--	24
Jun 1970	37	14	24	22
Jun 1971	34	20	26	20

FIGURE 2 (continued)

4. Japan has a security treaty with the United States for the defense of the country. Are you for or against this treaty?

	For	Against	Undecided	Other No answer.
Mar 1960	22	36	15*	27
Jun 1968	30	20	43	7

SOURCE: Nenkan, 1959, 135; and Mainichi Shimbun, 1 July 1968.

* Not interested.

5. Do you think the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty is useful for the maintenance of the security of Japan?

	Yes, it is useful.	No, it isn't useful.	No, it is even harmful.	Other
Apr 1969	52	23	14	11
Oct 1969	58	20	12	10
Apr 1972	48	25	14	13

SOURCE: Nanken, 1970, 476, 513; and Yoron Chosa, July 1972, 69.

SOURCE: Akio Watanabe, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs: 1964-1973," The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, edited by Robert Scalapino (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 138-39.

Sources for questions 1-3:

Question 1. Nenkan, 1968, 430; and 1970, 546.

Question 2. Yomiuri Shimbunsha, March and April 1968. Other results from Nenkan, 1970, 493.

Question 3. Asahi Shimbun, 5 Jan 1969; Nenkan, 1970, 499, and 1971, 552; and Yoron Chosa, Aug. 1971, 72.

encompasses five different questions concerning the Mutual Security Treaty during the period 1967-72. While statistically more people have found the treaty useful than not, it is clear that a popular consensus has not been reached.

The attitudes of the people on the above two subjects, moreover, has not changed in the decade of the 1980s. Figure 3 is a synopsis of people's attitudes on the SDF and the Mutual Defense Treaty. The information for this survey is part of an ongoing survey conducted every three years by the prime minister's office. This information was extracted from the 1988 DOJ white paper. (DOJ is an annual Japanese Defense Agency publication that addresses the state of Japan's defense). Nearly 70 percent of the surveyed people answered favorably to questions about the existence of the SDF and the Mutual Defense Treaty. When questioned about the importance of the SDF, however, more than 70 percent revealed that the most useful role to date for the SDF was in disaster relief operations. Less than 10 percent felt the SDF has a useful role in ensuring the nation's security.[32] Furthermore, in answer to the question, "Do you feel more strongly or weakly about defending your country than other people," only 50 percent of the people answered that they feel strongly, or more strongly than not, about defending Japan. Finally, 50 percent of the people surveyed

FIGURE 3

JAPANESE ATTITUDES ON DEFENSE









SOURCE DOJ (1988), 196.

feel Japan is in danger of being forced or drawn into a war.[33]

In fact, while the Japanese public has generally accepted the SDF, plans to change, improve, modernize, or enlarge the SDF are met with public skepticism, suspicion, opposition, and even hostility.[34]

This theme of fostering public acceptance for defense-related issues permeates post-World War II Japanese defense policy. Even when successes in treaty negotiations and national security issues are achieved, Japanese public opinion and support may be alienated. A clear example of this phenomenon was the negotiations to amend the initial Treaty of Security Between Japan and the United States of America. The new treaty, eventually ratified in January 1960, prompted a succession of protests and demonstrations over defense issues that continues to this day.[35]

While a consensus has not been reached on defense issues, public response to certain defense topics demonstrates that public opinion is both vocal and largely negative toward new defense issues. For example, in 1968, political parties and newspapers--in anticipation of a decision on the renewal of the Mutual Security Treaty in 1970--publicly questioned this policy, thereby focusing public attention on the issue.[36] In another instance, a February 1983 poll (taken after Prime Minister Nakasone's remarks concerning increased defense spending) revealed that

63 percent of the people surveyed opposed increased defense spending.[37]

Japanese Defense-Related Attitudes and Organizations

The verbal ammunition for Japanese defense-related views emanates from a wide spectrum of political-military thought. A number of political scientists have categorized these attitudes. In order to briefly describe the viewpoints of the different sectors of thought, I will use categories that Michael Mochizuki describes in his article in International Security: "Japan's Search for Strategy."[38] Mochizuki identifies four philosophical defense attitudes: that of the Political Realists, Unarmed Neutralists, Japanese Gaullists, and Military Realists.

For Mochizuki, the attitudes of the Political Realists form the Japanese mainstream concerning defense-related issues. The Political Realists are concerned with the diplomatic and political implications of Japanese security, as well as the strong pacifistic sentiments among many Japanese. The Political Realists, while favoring the U.S.-Japan military alliance, are concerned with Japan's inability to convince the United States that Japan is sharing the defense burden. Political Realists see no need to revise the constitution and believe that while the SDF may be improved qualitatively, there is little hope for

quantitative improvement. The Soviet threat, according to the Political Realists, is more political than military.

The Unarmed Neutralists, on the other hand, seek the termination of the Mutual Security Treaty and the signing of friendship treaties with neighboring countries. They view the constitution as an excellent restraint against increased military expansionism, which they continually oppose. Unarmed Neutralists oppose any further expansion of the SDF and view the Soviet Union and other countries as no military threat.

The Japanese Gaullists, on their part, believe that the Soviet Union poses a direct military threat, and while they support the Mutual Defense Treaty, doubt the U.S. commitment to come to the aid of Japan. Thus, the Japanese Gaullists believe that Japan must build a strong, independent military force capable of autonomous defense. Additionally, they believe that Japan should call for revisions in the U.S.-Japanese defense alliance that make it more equal. Military power, according to the Japanese Gaullists, should serve to project both national power and deterrence.

Finally, the Military Realists believe that defense issues should be discussed openly and realistic assessments made of regional and global threats. Military Realists believe domestic constraints should not determine defense policy. They advocate close U.S.-Japanese mutual-defense

cooperation and, unlike the Gaullists, do not believe that an autonomous defense is necessary. In fact, the Military Realists believe that strong U.S.-Japan defense cooperation inhibits a revival of Japanese militarism. In terms of the constitution, the Military Realists believe that the constitution should be reinterpreted to allow greater defensive capabilities. They feel that amending the constitution, however, is politically too difficult.

Now that these attitudes have been described, it is important to analyze what organizations embody these viewpoints and to determine their relative influence. While it may be argued that it is inaccurate to describe any particular group or association as wholly representative of a particular viewpoint, key organizations can be identified as strong supporters of one or another of these four defensive philosophies.

Political and Private Organizations

The organizations that most influence public opinion and affect U.S.-Japanese bilateral military cooperation are political and private organizations. Within the political world of Japan, the major political parties, other than the ruling LDP (Liberal Democratic Party), do not fully support the SDF.[39] Most of the LDP membership can be categorized as either Political or Military Realists. Thus, a politically dominant LDP under the leadership of a promilitary prime

minister (former Prime Minister Nakasone, for instance) is able to pursue defense issues more aggressively (within the bounds of domestic constraints). The LDP's strongest political rival, the JSP (Japan Socialist Party), continually opposes any LDP defense initiatives. The JSP members are best characterized as Unarmed Neutralists. While the JSP has reduced its overt hostility toward the existence of the SDF, its party platform is still very much antimilitary. For instance, in a major JSP policy speech on defense and security given on 10 September 1989, JSP chairwoman Takako Doi proposed setting sharp limits on the role of the SDF and the Mutual Security Treaty. Specifically, Doi called for the suspension of joint military exercises and the reduction and eventual elimination of U.S. bases in Japan. Doi stated that while the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty will be maintained to ensure diplomatic continuity, bilateral relations will shift in emphasis from military collaboration to stepped-up economic cooperation.[40] The influence of the Socialists, and to a lesser degree the Communists, is felt not just inside the Diet. The Socialists and Communist parties know that they can spark demonstrations outside the Diet to match the trouble their representatives cause within.[41] Two private organizations that generate the greatest public opinion threat to LDP defense policies are the mass media and the Nikkyoso (Japanese Teachers Union).

The availability and importance of the mass media--especially the three principal Tokyo daily newspapers--is discussed in more detail in Appendix A. However, a few points deserve amplification. First, Japanese newspapers have traditionally been antigovernment. The preponderance of editorial comment on the specific topic of defense issues opposes any increase in military expenditures or remilitarization.[42] Douglas Mendel, Jr., echoes this sentiment when he states: "The three national newspapers and most weekly and monthly magazines have been generally opposed to expanded military budgets and other defense proposals. . ."[43] The media also provides a wide forum for the influential intellectual community. Japanese intellectuals have voiced continual disapproval of expanded Japanese defense expenditures and initiatives.

However, the special interest group that commands impressive influence in Japanese society--and is extremely outspoken against the military--is the Nikkyoso (Japanese Teachers Union). Defense-related attitudes among the Nikkyoso fall strongly in the category of Unarmed Neutralists. The Nikkyoso is one of the most left-wing defenders of peace in Japanese society.[44] Not only does the Nikkyoso foment demonstrations during bilateral exercises, it also pervasively influences basic Japanese attitudes. In Japan, education is a top priority and teaching an honored profession. Teachers command considerable respect and wield

tremendous influence. Many teachers actively discourage their pupils from volunteering for the SDF. In some schools, the SDF is forbidden to put up recruiting posters, and a certain number of universities have refused to accept SDF members in their extension courses.[45] Most important, the left-wing antimilitary attitudes of the Nikkyoso are influencing the perceptions and attitudes of successive generations of Japanese students.

The relationship between government policy and public opinion, the lack of consensus among the Japanese on defense issues, the strong opposition to military measures among special interest groups, and antimilitary views among opposition political parties cause many problems for both the JSDF and bilateral military cooperation. Masashi Nishihara, professor of international relations at the National Defense Academy, Yokosuka, Japan, correctly sums up the effects of public opinion on government policy and attitudes:

> All political leaders who are concerned about their electoral votes must be careful not to alienate strong pacifist groups around the country; these are exploited by the Socialist party with a large degree of success. Some leading daily newspapers also exploit the pacifist sentiment. Because of Japan's consensus-oriented political culture, the government party is reluctant to take confrontational postures on defense. Thus Japanese political leaders tend to follow public opinion rather than to lead it. They are responsive to public opinion rather than being responsible for it.[46]

NOTES

Chapter 2

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CHAPTER 3

THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE JGSDF AND U.S.-JAPANESE BILATERAL GROUND EXERCISES

U.S. involvement in Korea in 1950 necessitated the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Japan to fight in Korea. General MacArthur, aware that the United States could not ensure internal Japanese order under the circumstances, established Japan's National Police Reserve. While U.S. forces were in Korea, this 75,000-strong force (the same size as the four U.S. divisions that deployed from Japan to Korea) could suppress possible insurrections in Japan.[1] On 15 October 1952, six months after Japan regained its sovereignty, the National Police Reserve's name was changed by law to the National Safety Agency. Finally, in 1954, after heated debate in the Diet, the National Safety Agency was redesignated the Self-Defense Force.[2]

The evolution of the Japanese Army from the National Police Reserve to the Self-Defense Force resulted as part of the Mutual Security Treaty negotiations between the United States and Japan. Initially, the United States had suggested a Japanese land force of approximately 325,000 men. However, Ideo Hayato, chief of the Japanese

delegation, elaborated a number of reasons why Japan could not accept this number. Most of the reasons centered on legal, sociopolitical, economic, and physical factors. Key restrictive factors were Japanese antimilitary sentiment, low national income, and low recruitment rate. These factors, excluding national income, are, as Makato Momoi, former professor of the National Institute for Defense Studies in Tokyo asserts, still valid today. Consequently, the United States, in signing the Mutual Security Treaty in 1953, settled for a Japanese land force of 180,000--the same number that is authorized today.[3]

American influence on Japanese defense is evident throughout Japan's demilitarization immediately following World War II, as well as Japan's remilitarization in the 1950s. Following World War II, the United States attempted to discredit the Japanese military. This complicated Japanese efforts to reestablish a credible military force. Douglas H. Mendel, Jr., in his article, "Public Views of the Japanese Defense System," recounts the numerous methods the U.S. occupation authorities used to discourage and quell Japanese remilitarization: "It is difficult to think of any step missed by the Occupation in its thorough campaign to discredit the former Japanese armed forces and prevent their restoration."[4] As examples of the suppressions of militarism, Mendel cites the widespread U.S. censorship of textbooks to remove favorable references to past military

heroes and victories, disbandment of veterans organizations, the removal of former military officers from government positions, and the firing of all nationalistic schoolteachers. More palpable means of U.S. repression were the convening of the war crimes trials and the rewriting of the Japanese constitution.[5]

Originally, the Self-Defense Force's mission was primarily internal security. Accomplishing this mission would also aid in fulfilling Japan's defense responsibilities under the newly created Mutual Defense Treaty.[6] Expanding the Self-Defense Force's role to more overt military missions, however, presented many more problems. For instance, from the beginning Japanese rearmament--initiated at U.S. insistence--did not have the consensus of the Japanese people.[7] In order to minimize public opposition, as well as regional suspicions, remilitarization of the Self-Defense Forces progressed cautiously--with a constant eye towards projecting the perception that remilitarization was solely for defensive reasons.

Unlike the Japanese Self-Defense Force, whose loyalty and political power are subject to public mistrust, the Japanese military in pre-World War II days was a dominant force in Japanese society. Mr Kurihara, former chief of the defense agency, relates: "In the old days the military was the emperor's military. . . the military

utilized the emperor's power of supreme command. . . to move politics. Military men held a veto over formation of cabinets."[8] In the restructured SDF, all vestiges of the old Imperial Army were destroyed. For example, even the basic imperial military language was abolished. The very name Self-Defense Force instead of "military force", as well as Ground Self-Defense Force instead of the "Japanese Army", and Maritime Self-Defense Force instead of "Japanese Navy", are obvious examples of the new semantic manipulations. Designations of ranks and ratings were also changed to distinguish the services from the old Imperial Army and Navy. In this way, it was hoped that the new defense force would be more acceptable to the public. Judicially, there are no military offenses or courts-marital per se, in the SDF.[9] Moreover, rarely will you find an SDF member wearing his uniform off post.

This policy of projecting a relatively peaceful defensive image carried over to the types and capabilities of equipment the Japanese used. United States-built and procured F-4 Phantom jets were modified and external fuel tanks removed from them at the insistence of the JSP so that they could be employed only in defensive roles.[10] Long-range missiles and other military hardware capable of offensive missions were banned. These efforts to deny the SDF weapons or systems that could be possibly used in a offensive fashion also limited the SDF's defensive

capabilities. This attitude, however, has lessened in recent years. Recently procured U.S.-built F-15 fighters, as well as those built in Japan, no longer have the earlier modifications.

The SDF, nonetheless, is still closely monitored and rigidly controlled by the Japanese civilian government. Article 66 of the constitution states that "The Prime Minister and other Ministers of State must be civilians." Moreover, defense laws require that the JDA remain an external, subordinate organ of the Prime Minister's Office. Additionally, the director-general of the Defense Agency, as well as other members of the JDA--with only a few exceptions--are civilian officials. The heads of three components of the SDF are civilian, and the Joint Staff Council serves only as an advisory body to the director-general (see figure 4). This arrangement is vastly different from Japan's pre-1945 structure. Before 1945, the ministers of war and navy were active duty officers--constitutional equals of the prime minister.[11]

Today, the prime minister and the Diet formulate defense policy and oversee weapons procurement, training, and deployment. Furthermore, the head of the JDA, the civilian spokesman for the SDF, is not afforded cabinet status. Consequently, the best and brightest bureaucrats shun the JDA because it is not prestigious, and upward political mobility is extremely rare.[12]

FIGURE 4
OUTLINE OF DEFENSE AGENCY ORGANIZATION

SOURCE: DOJ (1989), 286.



JGSDF Roles and Missions

JGSDF security objectives have increased since the JGSDF's inception as an internal security force. But even though the JGSDF's role has expanded, the civilian leadership strictly limits the scope and training of its units in performing security missions. The principal mission of the JGSDF is to protect Japan against direct and indirect aggression. Specific JGSDF missions include maintaining public order, participating in disaster relief, and repelling land invasions.[13] In reality, however, the strong Japanese national police force, which is professional as well as credible, executes public-order missions. Indeed, for a number of reasons, the JGSDF is not predisposed toward public-order missions. During the 1960 riots protesting renewal of the U.S.-Japanese Mutual Defense Treaty, the Japanese government debated whether to use the JGSDF to quell antimilitary protests. Ultimately, because of adverse public opinion, the government decided not to use the JGSDF, fearing that this would diminish its credibility.

The JGSDF actively participates in both disaster relief operations and antidisaster training programs organized by central and local Japanese governments.[14] Participation in these activities affords the JGSDF positive public exposure. However, JGSDF participation in these programs does have some drawbacks. Chapter 2 reveals that the Japanese public views the JGSDF as more useful in

disaster relief than in security operations. Additionally, JGSDF efforts to improve their capabilities in disaster relief operations detract from their ability to upgrade military training and readiness.

The consensus of the Japanese government is that the JGSDF is to be employed only when there has been a sudden and unjustifiable aggression against Japan; when there is no other proper means to deal with an aggression except by the exercise of the right of self-defense; and when the use of the right of self-defense is confined to the necessary minimum.[15] While the use of the JGSDF is not legally restricted to Japanese territorial land, the government (ruling LDP) has acquiesced to public sentiment and opposition party aversion and has considered it generally unconstitutional to deploy JGSDF forces overseas. This action would exceed the minimum force limit allowable for self-defense purposes.[16] Consequently, the JGSDF has never deployed as part of a United Nations peacekeeping effort.

JGSDF Structure and Organization

The JGSDF is organized into five regional armies (see figure 5). Each army is responsible for a certain geographical area of Japan (see map 2). The government-imposed and controlled command structure of the JGSDF ensures that power remains decentralized among the various

FIGURE 5

MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS OF THE JGSDF



SOURCE: DOJ (1989), 286.


MAP 2
NORTHERN ARMY
ASAHIKAWA
SAPPORO
HOKKAIDO
AOMORI
JAPAN
NORTHEASTERN ARMY
SENDAI
MIDDLE ARMY
HONSHU
CAMP ZAMA
TOKYO
EASTERN ARMY
KYUSHU
SHIKOKU
WESTERN ARMY
ARMY BOUNDARIES

JGSDF armies. Furthermore, the Joint Staff Council and the Ground Staff Office do not exercise centralized command and control over the respective elements of the SDF or JGSDF. Figure 4 graphically portrays this relationship.[17] But with civilian control resolutely maintained and central control of the military effectively denied, the ability of the JGSDF to effect sustained, coordinated training is seriously hampered. This relationship, as will be seen, poses serious consequences for the planning and execution of bilateral exercises.

The Evolution of U.S.-Japanese Bilateral Field Training Exercises

Military realists in the ruling LDP have privately realized for many years that Japan could not defend itself against a powerful aggressor without direct U.S. military involvement and thus have seen the need for U.S. Army-JGSDF bilateral field training exercises. By publicly announcing the need for such exercises in 1978, the LDP set the stage for substantive talks with the United States on bilateral military cooperation.[18] One of the basic premises of the U.S.-Japanese Security treaty is Article 5 which states:

> Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own

peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.[19]

Article 5 guarantees a U.S. military response to aggression against Japan. Inherent in this agreement is mutual U.S.-Japanese cooperation in repelling such an attack. However, increasingly strained U.S.-Japanese economic relations, in addition to renewed U.S. focus on other regions of the world, have led many in Japan in recent years to question U.S. resolve to come to the aid of Japan in time of crisis. Furthermore, although implied in Article 3, there have been no established standards or agreements on how to cooperate bilaterally to repel an enemy land invasion of Japan.

In order to maintain the credibility of the Mutual Security Treaty and present a viable deterrent against possible enemy aggression, the United States and Japan needed to initiate bilateral ground military cooperation. Thus, on 8 July 1976, the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee established the SDC (Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation) to study bilateral cooperation.[20]

The subcommittee, in the 27 November 1978 SDC "Report of the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperations to the Security Consultative Committee," summarized key bilateral cooperation concepts. The JDA's director-general presented this document to the cabinet. The cabinet, after debate and questions, then approved the document.[21] Provisions of the

"Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation" (guidance arising out of the committee's report) became a mandate for increased bilateral cooperation. The guidelines announced that in order to conduct coordinated operations for the defense of Japan, the JSDF and U.S. forces would conduct studies on joint-defense planning. More specifically, the United States and Japan would undertake necessary joint exercises and training when appropriate.[22]

JGSDF-U.S. Army Bilateral Cooperation-- Progress With Minor Complications?

The evolution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises is a study in both progress and predicament. Perhaps of greatest significance in terms of progress is the very fact that the United States and Japan conduct bilateral exercises. Further enhancing this joint relationship in the decade since bilateral exercises commenced are the increasing size and scope of these operations. On the surface, the future of bilateral exercise cooperation appears bright, with only minor complications.

Figure 6 presents a historical summary of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises. While the agreement to initiate U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises was reached in November of 1978, the first actual bilateral field training exercise was not conducted until September 1982. Prior to 1982, U.S.-Japanese bilateral interaction was limited to

FIGURE 6

HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF U.S.-JAPANESE BILATERAL GROUND EXERCISES

1982

Kami Kuma (Lightning Bear, 10-21 September 1982).

Combat signal elements from 1-35th Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light) and 73d Regimental Combat Team, 7th Armor Division, JGSDF, conducted company-level combat communications in a field environment.

Unnamed (8-20 November 1982).

First company level FTX conducted by combat elements of the 25th ID(L) and elements from the JGSDF's Northern Army.

1983

Hokuto (Northern Constellation, 24 September-21 October 1983).

Battalion (-) FTX involving 2-2 Infantry, 9th U.S. Infantry Division and 10th Regimental Combat Team, JGSDF. First live fire and bilateral airmobile operations.

1984

Golden Tsuba (Golden Sword Guard, September-October 1984).

Largest bilateral ground exercise to date. Involved a brigade (-) from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division and a regimental combat team from Northeastern Army's 6th Division. First exercise involving combined arms maneuver. Golden Tsuba was precursor to Orient Shield series of bilateral ground exercises.

Figure 6 (continued)

1985

Orient Shield 86 (October 1985).

Brigade-level exercise. Participants were from the 25th ID(L) and a regimental combat team from the JGSDF's 1st Infantry Division. Exercise included first bilateral equipment display and bilateral close air support operations.

1986

North Wind 86 (15-27 February 1986).

First bilateral cold weather, winter warfare FTX. Company C, 1-27th Infantry, 25th ID(L) deployed with 200 soldiers to train with approximately 150 JGSDF soldiers from the 27th Infantry Regiment, 2d Infantry Division. Special Forces from 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Okinawa, participated as ski instructors.

Orient Shield 87 (18 October-1 November 1986).

Brigade-level FTX conducted by 25th ID(L) and 11th Infantry Division, Northern Army. First use of U.S. close air support aircraft (A-10s) from outside Japan. (A-10s deployed from Korea.)

1987

North Wind 87 (12 February-1 March 1987).

Conducted at Camp Aomori, Northern Honshu. Participants were 3-22 Infantry, 25th ID(L) and elements from 5th Regiment, 9th Infantry Division, Northeastern Army. Special Forces soldiers from 2d Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group, Ft. Lewis, Washington, provided ski instruction.

Orient Shield 88 (24 October-10 November 1987).

First bilateral exercise conducted on Kyushu. First time U.S. soldiers returned to Kyushu since the American post-World War II occupation. Participants were 3rd Brigade,

Figure 6 (continued)

25th ID(L), and elements from the 4th Infantry Division, JGSDF Western Army.

1988

North Wind 88 (12-25 February 1988).

Exercise conducted at Camp Obihiro, Hokkaido. Participants were elements from the 3-21st Infantry, 25th ID(L) and 4th Regiment, 5th Infantry Division, JGSDF Northern Army.

Special Forces soldiers from 2d Battalion, 1st Special Forces, provided ski instruction. However, Special Forces soldiers were not permitted to participate in the actual bilateral FTX.

Orient Shield 89 (23 October-19 November 1988).

3d Brigade, 25th ID(L) and Northeastern Army's 6th Division conducted this exercise at Ojojibara training area, in northeastern Honshu. Exercise featured first close air support from F-16 aircraft and first tactical airdrop of supplies from C-130 aircraft.

1989

North Wind 89 (1-14 March 1989).

Battalion (-) task force from 25th ID(L) (395 soldiers) and elements form 25th Regiment, 2d Infantry Division, conducted cold-weather warfare operations at Camp Kamifurano, Hokkaido. Thirty-five soldiers from 2d Battalion, 1st Special Forces, provided ski instruction.

SOURCE: U.S. Army Japan, AJGC-E, "Historical Summary of the USARJ/IX Corps Exercise Program," 31 May 1989, 1-8.

JGSDF observation of U.S. unilateral exercises and the inclusion of liaison officers in CPXs (Command Post Exercises). Bilateral exercise Kami Kuma (Lightning Bear) focused on company-level combat communications interoperability--not combat operations. Successive bilateral exercises in 1983 and 1984 resulted in incremental progress in both the size and scope of bilateral exercises. However, Ski Venture, an attempt by the United States to train Special Forces soldiers in a cold weather environment in Hokkaido met strong resistance from local residents, the media, and subsequently the Foreign Ministry.[23] This forced USARJ/IX Corps to conduct the exercise at the U.S.-controlled Misawa Air Base on Honshu, Japan. While public backlash and criticism was a constant concern, bilateral exercises Orient Shield 86 and 87, as well as North Wind 86 and 87, were executed with positive results. However, Orient Shield 88 (24 October-10 November 1987)--the first bilateral exercise conducted on the southern island of Kyushu (see map 3)--resulted in considerable adverse public opinion. While members of USARJ/IX Corps and the American consulate attempted to gain public support for the exercise, JGSDF concerns about adverse public opinion limited the level of training. In fact, some training events were curtailed, and one full day of training was canceled because of local demonstrations.[24]


MAP 3
ASAHIKAWA
KAMIFURANO TRAINNG AREA
SAPPORO
HOKKAIDO-CHITOSE
TRAINING AREA
HOKKAIDO
AUBUSETSU
LARGE
TRAINING
AREA
AOMORI
JAPAN
MISAWA AIRBASE
WHITE YAMA TRAINING AREA
HOJOJISARA LARGE TRAINING AREA
SENDAI
HONSHU
ORIENT SHIELD 88
CAMP ZAMA
TOKYO
HIJUDAI TRAINING
AREA
KYUSHU
SHIKOKU

Analyzing U.S. Army-JGSDF bilateral exercise cooperation reveals how carefully and judiciously both the JDA and Japanese government focused on the problem of adverse public opinion as it related to bilateral exercise cooperation. Two obvious examples of the Japanese government-JDA concern are the secrecy surrounding bilateral exercise negotiations, as well as the incremental, tentative approach the JGSDF took in participating in these exercises. Arguments that the secrecy involved in conducting the negotiations to initiate combined bilateral ground exercises was necessary to safeguard security are both shallow and inaccurate. Equally suspect is the specious explanation that the piecemeal, measured approach the JGSDF took is in keeping with traditional Japanese behavior. In both instances, the JDA and Japanese government's concern was that adverse public opinion might stifle bilateral cooperation. (These are still valid concerns today.)

Considering that U.S. Army-JGSDF bilateral exercise cooperation prior to 1978 was nonexistent, progress made to date is, in many respects, noteworthy. Defining this progress is best accomplished by contrasting initial U.S.-Japanese bilateral objectives with current achievements.

United States and Japanese bilateral objectives may be categorized into national/strategic objectives and operational/tactical objectives. Strategically, from both the U.S. and Japanese perspectives, bilateral exercise

cooperation demonstrates the viability of the Mutual Defense Treaty. Additionally, close bilateral cooperation serves to strengthen the U.S. commitment to come to Japan's aid if it is attacked. In fact, close bilateral cooperation has served to allay fears by some Japanese officials that the United States would not fulfill its part of the treaty as expressed in Article 5. From the JGSDF's operational military perspective, combined training with U.S. forces has strengthened and upgraded Japanese training. Besides allowing the JGSDF increased training opportunities, the JGSDF also receives funds to upgrade buildings and training areas identified for bilateral exercises.

On its part, the United States benefits strategically through its practice in deploying forces by air and sea into areas that would be used in time of conflict. Additionally, training with its JGSDF counterparts has strengthened JGSDF-U.S. Army bonds of cooperation and friendship that are essential to successful combined warfare.

Progress has been made in other areas as well. The JGSDF and U.S. Army have refined bilateral command, control, and communications procedures. Additionally, the U.S. Army and JGSDF now conduct bilateral airmobile operations, live-fire exercises, and close air support operations. Combined offensive and defensive maneuvers have also been practiced and bilateral tactical SOPs have been refined.

United States Army troops have successfully deployed and trained with all five of the JGSDF army groups. Furthermore, U.S. soldiers have displayed excellent discipline and have behaved well in public. In many instances the fear and suspicion by the local population of U.S. soldiers has dissipated.

The many successes to date, however, overshadow formidable challenges to bilateral exercises.

NOTES

Chapter 3

1. McNelly, "Constitutionality," 100.

2. Nishihara, "Japanese Central Organization," 133.

3. Momoi, "Basic Trends," 345.

4. Mendel, "Public Views," 154.

5. Ibid., 154-55.

6. Martin E. Weinstein, "The Evolution of the Japan Self-Defense Forces," Modern Japanese Military System, 42.

7. Momoi, "Basic Trends," 349.

8. Sam Jameson, "Japanese See Threat in Soviet Pacific Buildup," The Los Angeles Times (23 August 1988):Sect. 1, p. 8.

9. Leonard A. Humphreys, "The Japanese Military Tradition," Modern Japanese Military System, 37.

10. Colonel Maususaki Hajime and Lieutenant Colonel Brian Shiroyama, "Prospect of Increased Japanese Military Burdensharing," Student research paper, Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 30 March 1988, 31.

11. Weinstein, "Evolution," 181.

12. Tracy Dahlby, "Defense Without Militarism," Far Eastern Economic Review, Part 5 (29 May 1981):35.

13. DOJ (1989), 84.

14. Ibid., 202.

15. DOJ, (1983), 58-59.

16. The GOJ has discussed possible deployment of JGSDF units outside of Japan to serve as part of a multinational peacekeeping force. The JSP continually challenges this possible action as exceeding the bounds of minimum necessary defense.

17. DOJ (1989), 285.

18. DOJ (1988), 85.

19. DOJ (1989), 85.

20. Ibid., 280.

21. DOJ (1988), 85-86.

22. "Report of the Subcommittee For Defense Cooperation to the Security Consultative Committee," Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, 27 November 1978, 2. Information from USARJ/IX Corps G3 working files.

23. U.S. Army Japan, AJGC-E, "Historical Summary of the USARJ/IX Corps Exercise Program, 31 May 1989, 3, hereafter cited as "Historical Summary."

24. "Historical Summary," 6.

CHAPTER 4

THE INFLUENCE OF PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENT POLICY ON THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF BILATERAL GROUND EXERCISES

The bilateral planning process is a multifaceted procedure that involves and encompasses many organizations. The goal of this chapter is to analyze and discuss the influences of government policy and public opinion on the bilateral ground exercise planning and execution process. In order to understand this process, it is necessary to briefly explain the structure of the bilateral planning process, as well as to identify the key participants.

The bilateral exercise process consists of planning, coordination, and execution at three different echelons. Each of these levels involve bilateral interaction between U.S. Army and JGSDF elements. Additionally, while planning and coordination at each echelon is distinctive, interaction between elements in one echelon with elements in another echelon is routine.

The bilateral exercise "sponsors" comprise the first echelon. The U.S. Army-JGSDF bilateral ground exercise sponsors are USARJ/IX Corps and the Japanese Army's GSO

(Ground Staff Office). The second echelon consists of U.S. elements from USARJ/IX Corps and the 25ID(L) (25th Infantry Division [Light]), and Japanese Army elements from the GSO (Ground Staff Office) and the "hosting" JGSDF army. The third echelon consists of the "player units" (actual exercise training units). In Orient Shield exercises, these units consist of a brigade from the 25ID(L), and two regiments out of a division from the host JGSDF army. (Figure 7 portrays this somewhat complex structure.)

The U.S. host for bilateral ground exercises, USARJ/IX Corps, is located at Camp Zama, Japan. USARJ/IX Corps is the senior U.S. Army organization in Japan and is commanded by a lieutenant general. USARJ/IX Corps consists of staff and support personnel, but *no combat troops*. Combat units that participate in USARJ/IX Corps-sponsored exercises deploy from other regions of PACOM (Pacific Command). Since 1985, units from the 25ID(L) have been the principal exercise participants.

USARJ/IX Corps' bilateral exercise counterpart is GSO. The Japanese-government-imposed command structure, however, does not allow GSO the authority to unilaterally make bilateral exercise planning decisions. This is because the Joint Staff Office, as well as each regional GSDF army, is on an equal footing with GSO. (Figure 4 reveals the nature of the civilian controlled-defense apparatus that effectively denies the military any centralized control in

FIGURE 7

BILATERAL EXERCISE RELATIONSHIP



decision making.) Consequently, USARJ/IX Corps' relationships and coordination with its Japanese counterparts are involved.

The organization depicted in figure 4 reflects the Japanese consensus management model. However, government-imposed restrictions have added additional levels of competing decision makers. For instance, GSO proposals on bilateral exercise-related topics must also have the approval of different elements inside the Internal Bureau. The Defense Facilities Administration Agency, as well as the Director General of the Defense Agency, must also approve GSO bilateral initiatives. Even under optimal conditions, this expanded decision cycle limits decisive and objective planning.[1]

Planning Limitations

Government policies and public opinion tend to limit available planning options from the beginning of the planning process to the end. For instance, government policy and public opinion greatly influence the decision where to conduct training. Unlike U.S. training exercises in other regions of the world, the Japanese government prohibits military training outside officially designated JGSDF training areas. Since Japan is about the geographic size of California, with a population half the size of the United States, space is at a premium.[2] However, the real

reason for Japan's conservative stance on land use is not the lack of space (the northern island of Hokkaido has large tracts of wilderness). The central reason is the Japanese public's concern over noise levels, safety, disruption to daily life, and maneuver damage. In addition, the mainstream Japanese populace is largely unaware of the need for realistic military training. Moreover, local politicians, as well as the JGSDF are unwilling to pursue the issue of acquiring additional training space because of the distinct possibility of unwanted publicity and negative media reaction.[3] Thus, U.S. and JGSDF units are not able to train on the specific ground that they likely would have to defend in time of war. They are forced to relinquish a key advantage of the defender: the ability to know the terrain better than the enemy.

Even considering the available land, Japanese training areas are small. (Figure 8 lists the major training areas in Japan.) Additionally, even in these authorized areas, public pressure influences the nature and scope of training. Sometimes ideal training areas are left unused because of public pressure. The Betsukai Yausubetsu Large Maneuver Area--Japan's largest maneuver area--would provide the best location for brigade-size light infantry units that participate in Orient Shield. Yausubetsu is situated in southeastern Hokkaido, far removed from the large urban areas. However, local farmers and horse owners

FIGURE 8

MAJOR JGSDF TRAINING AREAS

RANK (SIZE)	NAME OF TRAINING AREA	LOCATION	SIZE (SQUARE METERS)	MAXIMUM RANGE WEAPONS FIRING (METERS)
1	YAUSUBETSU	HOKKAIDO	168,058,787	18,000
2	EAST FUJI	HONSHU	87,886,078	4,000
3	HIJUDAI	KYUSHU	49,064,856	6,000
4	SHIMAMATSU	HOKKAIDO	48,872,363	6,000
5	NORTH FUJI	HONSHU	47,717,666	6,000
6	OJOJIBARU	HONSHU	43,439,216	11,000
7	KAMI-FURANO	HOKKAIDO	35,306,367	6,500
8	SHIKARIBETSU	HOKKAIDO	33,310,175	4,000
9	AIBANO	HONSHU	23,104,581	4,000
10	IWATEYAMA	HONSHU	23,010,968	4,500

SOURCE: U.S. ARMY JAPAN G2 FILES

continually oppose exercises, which they feel inhibit milk production and cause injury to frightened horses. Their opposition is especially vented towards disturbances from aircraft and mechanized vehicles. USARJ/IX Corps has actively pursued Yausubetsu Training Area as a site for an Orient Shield exercise. To date, no bilateral exercises have been conducted at Yausubetsu Training Area due to public opposition.

The JGSDF always attempts to maintain a positive public image in areas where it participates in training and exercises. North Wind exercises in Hokkaido are conducted at the same time as the Sapporo Ice Festival and regional civilian winter ski tournaments. Therefore, the JGSDF actively supports these civilian-sponsored events. In fact, the JGSDF makes many of the elaborate ice sculptures for the Sapporo Ice Festival. Participation in these high visibility-events affords the JGSDF good public exposure. JGSDF-sponsored cross-country ski tournaments and other winter sporting events permits civilians access to JGSDF bases. These activities provide positive reinforcement for the JGSDF image as well as civilian exposure to JGSDF bases.

However, if a bilateral exercise is scheduled with a JGSDF unit participating in one of these activities, problems arise. Because the JGSDF and government want to keep bilateral exercises under a low profile, any attempts to coordinate U.S. Army activities, which at the same time

expose Japanese civilians to U.S. soldiers, are shunned. This may appear to be a small problem, but coupled with other restrictions--the most important being the time allotted to conduct the bilateral exercise--it becomes increasingly important. For instance, U.S. support operations cannot begin until after civilian winter sporting activities have been totally completed. Likewise, many support activities after the termination of an exercise have to be rushed due to time constraints. These time constraints are forced on the JGSDF by a combination of government-imposed restrictions on exercise length and by public pressure.

An example of this situation is article II.4.b. of the U.S.-Japanese SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement). Article II.4.b. permits U.S. use of Japanese facilities during bilateral exercises. The II.4.b. agreement restricts the U.S. military to the use of specific facilities for a limited number of days each year. (Figure 9 represents major II.4.b.-approved training areas.) Although II.4.b. authorizes U.S. use of facilities for given time periods, USARJ/IX Corps must negotiate the specific usage for each bilateral exercise. The administrative procedures for accomplishing this task are listed in figure 10. As the figure reveals, this process is very complicated. Not only are many bureaucratic steps involved in the process, but key agencies also influence the final outcome. For instance,

FIGURE 9

U.S. ARMY II.4.b. APPROVED TRAINING AREAS

FACILITY NAME	LAND (ACRES)	NUMBER BLDG	PERIOD OF USE
HOKKAIDO-CHITOSE (INCLUDES SHIMAMATSU ENIWA, CHITOSE, HIGASHI-CHITOSE, KASHIWADAI)	22,202	4	4 WEEKS/YEAR
YAUSUBETSU LARGE MANEUVER AREA	41,562	29	6 WEEKS/YEAR
KAMIFURANO MEDIUM MANEUVER AREA	8,574	24	6 WEEKS/YEAR
OJOJIBARA LARGE MANEUVER AREA	10,210	32	6 WEEKS/YEAR
IWATE YAMA MEDIUM MANEUVER AREA	5,750	34	6 WEEKS/YEAR

SOURCE: U.S. ARMY JAPAN, G3 FILES

FIGURE 10 **II.4. B APPROVAL PROCEDURE**

SOURCE: U.S. ARMY JAPAN, GS FILES



civilian government bureaus, the DFAA (Defense Facilities Administration Agency), and the DFAB (Defense Facilities Administrative Board) screen all requests. The army hosting the bilateral exercise and the DFAB, in conjunction with the local government, also negotiate the use of the training area. It is during this phase of II.4.b. negotiations that pressures from the local government can influence approval or disapproval of certain training areas or facilities within a particular training area. If the local population is concerned about excessive noise from a particular firing range or activity in a portion of the training area, the U.S. Army is dissuaded from using those areas. If the U.S. Army continues to insist through the JGSDF to use a particular area, permission to use that area will very likely include numerous restrictions.

An example of this problem was the coordination during North Wind 89 for use of a range to conduct night firing. Both U.S. and Japanese soldiers would have benefited from firing at night with night vision devices. In the process of negotiating this agreement, however, the local populace made it quite clear that they strongly opposed night firing. The JGSDF, therefore, was not willing to pursue the issue. As a result, bilateral night firing was not conducted.

Similar problems surface when negotiations take place concerning the duration of bilateral exercises and the

number and types of U.S. personnel authorized to participate in them. Because of the expenses incurred in deploying overseas, most U.S. army overseas deployments schedule thirty days of training to maximize training opportunities. Unfortunately, pressures from the local populace and, in some cases, local government authorities compel GSO to limit U.S. Army deployments and the number of involved personnel. These limitations are not imposed because training areas are unavailable.[4] Rather, GSO, through the Internal Bureau, receives guidance (as a direct result of public pressures or local government concerns about noise and safety considerations) that dictates the maximum number and types of U.S. participants, as well as the time available for training.

In addition to these pressures, the JGSDF is also concerned about long-term negative public opinion and news reports affecting the ability of local JGSDF units to train after a bilateral exercise is complete. An incident at the Higashi-Chitose training area in Hokkaido illustrates this problem. During a previous bilateral exercise at Higashi-Chitose, anti-SDF civilian observers positioned themselves near the training area boundaries to observe training activities and report any violations or incidents to anti-SDF elements in the news media. During the FTX maneuver phase of the exercise, civilian observers witnessed a U.S. unit maneuver administratively between the boundaries of two

portions of the training area. (A civilian road bisected this boundary.) When the lead element cleared the civilian road, it set up in an overwatch position to cover the movement of the trail element. The lead element was inside the training area but in clear view of the road and civilian observers. The civilian observers took pictures of the U.S. unit, and the local media portrayed the incident as an irresponsible action that could have injured or startled drivers and unnecessarily frightened young children. Subsequently, the JGSDF was forced to curtail unilateral training until the incident died down.[5]

During Orient Shield 90, U.S. CH-47 aircraft sling-loaded 105mm howitzers across the same road resulting in more negative press. Additionally, civilian observers witnessed training taking place in an area not previously coordinated.[6]

In an earlier operation, North Wind 89, the maximum number of U.S. personnel authorized for the exercise was 450. This number included support personnel as well as combat soldiers. However, the authorized strength of a light infantry battalion is 559 men. Consequently, the U.S. was not able to deploy and train bilaterally as an integral battalion task force. This is another example of constraints placed on bilateral exercises.

United States Special Forces participation in the North Wind exercise also posed significant problems.

Initially, the JGSDF disapproved of any U.S. Special Forces participation in North Wind exercises. The JGSDF believed that it would be too difficult to justify the use of U.S. Special Forces to the Diet. Since the JGSDF does not have a comparable unit (counterpart) to the U.S. Special Forces, it made it exceedingly difficult for the JGSDF to cooperate bilaterally with U.S. Special Forces personnel. After difficult negotiations, U.S. Special Forces from Okinawa were permitted to participate in the exercise-- but only as cold weather warfare instructors. Additionally, Special Forces personnel had to redeploy prior to the actual FTX. Moreover, the JGSDF continues to enforce the policy of limiting U.S. Special Forces participation in North Wind exercises to cold weather warfare instruction.

During North Wind 87, Ft. Lewis-based Special Forces soldiers were scheduled to conduct cold weather warfare instruction. However, the JGSDF feared that out-of-country Special Forces soldiers would provoke negative public reaction. As a result, the U.S. was compelled to deploy Ft. Lewis-based soldiers through Okinawa to avoid the perception that out-of-country special operations forces were participating in bilateral training.[7]

In addition, during North Wind 90, the participating JGSDF division was host to a civilian winter sports festival. Because of JGSDF concerns about civilian reaction to seeing U.S. support troops on post during the sports

festival, the U.S. Army was obliged to delay its advance-party deployment. By deploying advance-party personnel at the last moment, however, the amount and type of support available for main body personnel was limited.

Placing strict limits on the maximum available time for deployment, bilateral training, and redeployment inhibits effective training. This was especially evident during North Wind exercises. When U.S. troops stationed in Hawaii deploy to northern Japan for North Wind, they have to contend with two major problems. The first problem is the need to acclimatize to the extreme change in weather. The second problem is the need for U.S. soldiers to acquire the necessary military skiing skills in order for them to effectively train bilaterally with their Japanese counterparts. (Japanese soldiers stationed in northern Japan are excellent military skiers.) U.S. soldiers who receive seven days of preparatory ski training are much more prepared to participate in bilateral cold weather training than soldiers who receive one or two days of training. Additionally, by the end of 7 days, soldiers are more acclimatized.

However, strict limits on the duration of North Wind exercises has limited available time for preparatory training. As a result, U.S. soldiers are many times unable to maintain the prescribed rate of march during tactical cross-country ski operations.[8]

Coordination of Participating Units

Coordinating the use of participating units in bilateral exercises involves developing a training plan that will maximize bilateral training opportunities in as realistic a scenario as possible. While coordinating the training activities of participating units, many of the concerns about adverse public opinion, as well as government policy limitations become prominent. For instance, training in a simulated NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) environment is strictly controlled in bilateral exercises. The JGSDF fears that the news media will stimulate public outcries against exercises that portray NBC training activities. This fear was so dominant that until Orient Shield 89, the JGSDF asked U.S. units not to carry their protective masks.

Command and Control Relationships

Another serious limitation to bilateral exercises results from command and control relationships. Combined bilateral training necessitates close cooperation and strict control of combat units. Habitually, U.S. Army units fighting in a combined environment attach or receive forces from allied armies. This OPCON (operational control) relationship ensures unity of command and allows the commander flexibility in deploying his units to best

accomplish his mission. Because of Japanese government policy, however, JGSDF units are forbidden to engage in OPCON relationships with U.S. forces. This situation seriously limits combined operations. In a strictly controlled training environment, this relationship is inflexible, inefficient, and complicates mission execution. In the less-controlled environment of combat, these restrictions on command and control authority could have disastrous consequences.

In the past, the JGSDF has been so concerned that the media would report that U.S. commanders had control over Japanese units, or vice a versa, that even reciprocal unit exchange programs had to be canceled. Reciprocal unit exchanges involved switching a Japanese unit (squad, platoon or company) with a comparable U.S. unit for a day of training. This gave each country a better appreciation for the training methods and unique culture of the other country. This exchange was not limited to combat units but spanned the entire spectrum of combat support and combat service support units. This program was executed during Orient Shield 88, and soldier feedback from both the U.S. and Japanese side was universally positive. However, concerns about media coverage during Orient Shield 88 and speculation that this relationship was seen as placing Japanese soldiers under U.S. command and control authority, resulted in this program being canceled.[9]

Air-Ground Operations

When coordinating air operations in support of a bilateral ground exercise, the center of focus should be on ensuring close cooperation of air-ground operations. Consequently, when coordinating air operations in support of Orient Shield, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force focused on maximizing the use of combat aircraft in concert with ground operations. But at the same time, the JGSDF focused on limiting the number of sorties rather than on maximizing air operations. Once again, public concerns about aircraft noise, and in some cases, political considerations restricted the JGSDF's options. In many respects, U.S.-Japanese coordination of such air assets resemble negotiations, rather than coordination.

Orient Shield 87, 88, and 89 provide good examples of problems associated with these issues. The U.S. Fifth Air Force, headquartered in Yokota Air Force Base, Japan, is the primary point of contact for coordinating air support for the Orient Shield exercises. However, Fifth Air Force does not have fighter aircraft permanently stationed at Yokota Air Base. The nearest air support aircraft are stationed in South Korea. The problem of using fighter aircraft stationed in Korea for exercises in Japan posed serious problems for JGSDF planners during Orient Shield 87.[10] A key concern was that the use of U.S. aircraft stationed in Korea might be perceived by the Japanese media

and public as the beginning of a collective security arrangement.[11] The U.S. Fifth Air Force had to coordinate the stationing of these U.S. Seventh Air Force Korean-based A-10 Thunderbolts at a JASDF airbase. The JASDF was unwilling to agree to this arrangement. Finally, one week before the exercise was scheduled to begin, the JASDF acquiesced.[12] JASDF concerns were not limited to perceptions about the collective security issue and possible demonstrations; the JASDF was also concerned that the increased fighter activity would cause public complaints about noise levels. This negative public reaction, they feared, might also jeopardize their long-term unilateral training opportunities. During Orient Shield 88, the U.S. Air Force was pressured into canceling a number of sorties after repeated citizen complaints about noise levels. Adverse public reactions to that exercise eventually caused the JASDF to withdraw its support to provide U.S. Air Force A-10s a landing and maintenance facility at its Nutabaru Air Base.[13]

Joint operations during Orient Shield 89 presented similar problems. Once again, U.S. Air Force fighter assets came from units stationed in Korea. However, since the introduction of Korean-based aircraft during Orient Shield 87, public reaction to Korean based aircraft had dissipated. On this occasion, however, the JGSDF had to contend with the new problem that F-16 fighters were scheduled to fly the CAS

(close air support) missions for Orient Shield 89--instead of A-10s. (The F-16 is taking over the A-10 CAS mission.) The U.S. F-16 fighter aircraft permanently stationed in Misawa Air Force base in northeastern Honshu, but not participating in Orient Shield 89, fueled adverse local Japanese public opinion regarding the F-16. In addition to the noise problem it posed, a Misawa based F-16 crashed during coordination for Orient Shield 89 and heightened public concern about the safe use of the single-engine F-16 fighter. Negotiations to determine the number of sorties per day were intense, and the U.S. Air Force seriously considered withdrawing from the exercise. They were concerned that the limited number of sorties hampered training to such an extent that the exercise would not be cost effective. Further, the very structured "windows" during which the sorties were scheduled to fly were unrealistic and did not complement the tactical situation.

Because F-16s were being used for the first time in an Orient Shield exercise and public opinion was vocal and negative, the JASDF was reluctant to participate in the planning and execution of Orient Shield 89.[14] Additional friction materialized because the U.S. Fifth Air Force's representative felt that the JGSDF was not abiding by previously agreed on sortie numbers. Mistakes in interpretation occasionally occur when coordinating with other countries--especially in Japan, where the language is

particularly difficult to understand. In this case, however, the problem was not in misinterpretation but rather resulted from public pressure to limit U.S. Air Force participation. For example, sometimes after an agreement in principle was reached with U.S. officials at a coordination meeting, the JGSDF went to a local government to explain its situation. When the local populace voiced strong opposition, the JGSDF was forced to renegotiate its position with U.S. Fifth Air Force.

During Orient Shield 90, U.S. planners experienced a continuation of unrealistic, nonintegrated, joint bilateral operations. What was particularly discouraging in this situation was that the lack of realistic joint-training opportunities at Yausubetsu Training Area had prompted U.S. planners to negotiate Orient Shield 90 at the Higashi-Chitose Training Area.[15] Since the JASDF habitually conducts training missions in Higashi-Chitose Training Area, it was considered an appropriate site. Furthermore, since a key training objective of Orient Shield 90 was the execution of joint operations, Higashi-Chitose also presented much better opportunities than Yausubetsu for operations.[16] Unfortunately, local Japanese public pressure limited both the scope and realism of joint operations: U.S. Air Force F-16s sorties were limited; flight routes into the training area were strictly regulated; and an unrealistically high minimum altitude was established for fighter aircraft.

Furthermore, CAS was not integrated into the exercise scenario. Consequently, realistic CAS and joint air-ground operations suffered.[17]

The coordination for live-fire exercises during Orient Shield 89 again revealed the whole spectrum of difficulties posed by public opinion pressures, consensus decision making, and the inability of the JGSDF to take risks. In this case, the local populace had already been exposed to previous U.S.-JGSDF bilateral cooperation. In 1984, U.S. forces trained together with the JGSDF's Northeastern Army at the Ojojibara Training Area during bilateral exercise Golden Tsuba.[18] Additionally, U.S.-JGSDF bilateral CPX training command post exercises had been conducted at Northeastern Army headquarters at Camp Sendai.

Nonetheless, during coordination for Orient Shield 89, a JGSDF tank round ricocheted out of the impact area into a forested area adjacent to the training area. While no one was hurt and the round fell well away from any populated area, local forestry personnel working nearby heard the round impact and filed a complaint through the local government.[19] The Northeastern Army commander voluntarily suspended all firing pending an investigation. U.S.-JGSDF coordination for live-fire training events was also suspended.

This problem would not have posed serious bilateral exercise coordination problems if, once the joint JGSDF-

local police investigation was completed, coordination had continued. However, it became evident that completing the investigation was not the key to resumption of live-fire coordination. Rather, gaining consensus among the local populace to renew live firing was the critical issue. The 25th Infantry Division (L) was anxious to gain a decision so that training and ammunition requirements could be completed. As USARJ/IX Corps project officer for Orient Shield 89, I worked closely with GSO monitoring this situation. As each deadline for a decision passed, the time available to coordinate training requirements, ammunition requests, and ship ammunition became more and more critical. A decision needed to be made.

It was apparent that GSO wanted to conduct live-fire exercises, and if it had been possible, would have made the decision.[20] However, GSO, because of civilian-established command relationships, could not direct Northeastern Army tc conduct live-fire exercises. While the Northeastern Army commander, who had voluntarily suspended fire, was legally able to rescind the suspension at any time, strong public pressure prevented him from making the decision until a local public consensus had been reached.[21] Less than a month before the start of the exercise, permission to conduct live-fire exercises was given--but with appreciable restrictions. Previously coordinated AH-1 Attack helicopter live firing, for instance, was canceled. Additional

restrictions also were placed on 105-mm artillery firing that seriously degraded tactical realism.

Training realism has constantly suffered during bilateral exercises. Thomas Brendle's article, "Recruitment and Training in the SDF," addresses this problem when he states:

> It is difficult to assess accurately the effectiveness of SDF training, but it is certain that limited popular support combined with a watchdog press have tended to magnify every accident and irregularity--thus forcing the services to sacrifice realism for safety.[22]

The U.S. Army has learned that it is essential to conduct realistic, live-fire exercises under tactical situations during the day as well as at night. The credo "train the way you fight" is well understood by U.S. forces and is implemented at every opportunity. This concept is also not lost on the highly professional JGSDF officer corps. Nevertheless, because the JGSDF is under a public opinion microscope, it is forced to conduct unrealistic training. In turn, U.S. units conducting bilateral live-fire exercises are obliged to adhere to the same range requirements as the JGSDF. Instead of tactically driven, realistic live fires, U.S.-JGSDF bilateral live-fire exercises consist of squads on line, with a safety instructor behind each man.[23] Fire and maneuver is either strictly limited or, in most cases, forbidden. Use of supporting fires from the flanks or indirect fire support is

likewise prohibited. Moreover, night firing under these same conditions is also not permitted.

The inability of the JGSDF to take risks also applies to other high-risk training events. Light infantry units are habitually resupplied by airdrops. During coordination for Orient Shield 89, the opportunity presented itself to use U.S. C-130 Hercules aircraft stationed at Yokota Air Base, Japan, for tactical resupply operations. This would afford U.S. and Japanese combat troops an excellent opportunity to incorporate airdrop missions into the bilateral exercise at no financial cost to either the JGSDF or U.S. Army. (U.S. Fifth Air Force would use its own flying hours and considered this a training mission.)

Coordination with GSO on this excellent opportunity was very difficult because of GSO's uneasiness over executing a new "risky" operation. After repeated negotiations and explanations about the safety and low risk associated with the exercise, GSO agreed to consider it.[24] GSO's "concurrence," however, did not mean final approval and was, in fact, the beginning of another very difficult, detailed coordination process.

The 25th Infantry Division (Light) and the JGSDF's 6th Division were in the process of coordinating the bilateral FTX portion of the exercise. The tactical scenario necessitated resupply operations during the FTX. However, Northeastern Army and 6th Division's concerns about

troop safety would not allow air resupply operations during the FTX. After relentless U.S. pressure, Northea tern Army and the 6th Division finally agreed to allow the airdrop, but only under restricted conditions.

The U.S. Air Force C130s were only permitted to drop one dummy door bundle into a cordoned-off area well away from tactical units. Each of the three C130s had to be separated by five minutes to allow the JGSDF's 6th Division the opportunity to abort the airdrop if they saw something they did not like. These conditions totally negated realism and any tactical training value.

Bilateral Exercise Execution

Demonstrations and local citizen complaints complicate bilateral exercise execution. The JGSDF is always concerned about disturbances from demonstrators and deploys large numbers of troops to ensure exercise security. Additionally, the JGSDF scrutinizes nightly local news programs for reactions to the bilateral exercises. Consequently, freedom of action and flexibility in exercise execution is difficult to achieve. For example, there is little opportunity to alter the training schedule if unforeseen circumstances arise. If the weather forces cancelation of a firing range, firing cannot be rescheduled, even if the range is not being used.

Vehicular movement off post is also strictly controlled. In the case of Orient Shield 88, JGSDF fears of demonstrator disturbances and vehicle accidents resulted in vehicular movement by convoy only. (This policy posed significant problems in that U.S. forces were training in three different areas.) Additionally, Nikkyoso (the Japanese Teachers Union) instigated demonstrations along the periphery of the training area, which limited U.S. access to certain sections.

Repeated complaints of noise by local school officials also pose problems for bilateral exercises. In some instances, U.S. aviation units must alter their flight routes. In other instances, requests to limit flying during certain hours disrupts ongoing tactical operations.

While training restrictions are not unique to Japan, an analysis of the influence of Japanese public opinion and government policy on U.S. Army-JGSDF bilateral exercises cooperation reveals limitations and restrictions that seriously threaten our capability to train and fight effectively on the same battlefield.

NOTES

Chapter 4

1. Hellman, "Japanese Security," 332.

2. Tsurutani, "Japan's Security," 98.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Peyton, Letter to Major Donald J. McGhee, 20 March 1990.

4. U.S. Army Japan, "JGSDF Training Areas/Ranges," Camp Zama, Japan, 1 April 1980.

5. Lieutenant Colonel Paul Peyton, "USARJ/IX Corps Liaison Officer to Northern Army After Action Report on Bilateral FTXs Forest Light 90-1 and Orient Shield 90," U.S. Army Japan, 26 February 1990, 16.

6. Peyton, "USARJ/IX Corps," 17.

7. "Historical Summary," 5.

8. Major Donald J. McGhee, "AAR Notes on North Wind 88," March 1988, author's personal file.

9. Author discussions with GSO counterpart.

10. "Historical Summary," 4.

11. U.S. Army Japan, AJPA-CRD, Translation of Asahi Shimbun article, "A Step Forward To Cope With `Emergency In Japan'- Japan-U.S. Ground Troops FTX Concluded and Allied Spirit Enhanced (19 November 1982):4.

12. "Historical Summary," 5.

13. Ibid., 6.

14. The author personally observed and participated in these discussions.

15. The author conveyed to his GSO counterpart U.S. desires to train at the Yausubetsu major training area. U.S. discussions on this issue also surfaced at the quarterly TSP (Training Study Panel) attended by members of U.S. Army Japan Exercise Division and JGSDF GSO Training Division counterparts.

16. USARJ/IX Corps, "Orient Shield 90 Exercise Directive," Camp Zama, Japan, 17 August 1989, Annex A.

17. Colonel Robert Odom, DCSOPS/G3, USARJ/IX Corps, Japan, interview with author, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 13 October 1989

18. "Historical Summary," 3.

19. I received frequent updates on this situation from my counterpart at GSO.

20. The lack of a decision on whether there would be live fire training at Ojojibara prompted detailed U.S. inquiries as to who was authorized to make the decision to resume live fire operations. Discussions with GSO representatives revealed that the commanding general of Northeastern Army had the authority to order resumption of live fire exercises at Ojojibara training area. However, GSO, although a higher echelon headquarters, could not order the northeastern Army commander to resume live fire operations.

21. I found it difficult to understand that the JGSDF had to have the consensus of <u>all</u> of the villages surrounding Ojojibara training area before live firing exercises could resume.

22. Thomas M. Brendle, "Recruitment and Training in the SDF," <u>Modern Japanese Military System</u>, 94.

23. Authors observations of live fire exercises during North Wind 88 at Obihiro, Japan. I also observed this method of conducting live fire exercises during other bilateral exercises.

24. It took numerous coordination visits, exchanges of data and assurances to gain GSO approval.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Nonexistent in 1978, U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises have increased in both size and scope in the decade of the 80s. Bilateral ground exercises have become the largest single factor that improve the readiness of the JGSDF. Ordinary unilateral JGSDF training has too often centered around exercising in the same familiar training area while executing standard training missions. Even JGSDF ARTEP (Army Training and Evaluation Plan) exercises have offered few surprises or challenges for Japanese forces. It is only through bilateral ground exercise cooperation with U.S. military units that the JGSDF had been exposed to new doctrine, tactical techniques, procedures, and realistic training methods.[1]

On their part, U.S. units involved in bilateral exercises with the JGSDF are confronted with stringent range restrictions, pervasive Japanese political constraints, and participating forces (the JGSDF) that are ultrasensitive to negative Japanese public opinion concerning the scope and intensity of training. In terms of increasing unit tactical skills under realistic conditions, U.S. units have received

little training benefit in such an environment. However, U.S. Army units have benefited from the training they have received while deploying strategically to Japan. Additionally, training with the JGSDF has increased U.S. Army understanding of the JGSDF and has strengthened the bonds of friendship essential to successful combined warfare. Nonetheless, the negative factors have weighed heavily against the effectiveness of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises.

The Need for Progress

While the U.S. and Japanese governments were initially satisfied with the progress of bilateral ground exercises, recent exercises (especially from the U.S. perspective) have been viewed as inefficient and cost ineffective. The Eighteenth Japan-U.S. Security Subcommittee meeting held in May 1988 addressed this issue. At the conclusion of the meeting, both the United States and Japanese representatives articulated the importance of continuing to improve the quality of combined exercises and making them more efficient.[2] However, the ability to fulfill the mandate of the Eighteenth Subcommittee with present Japanese government policies and public attitudes will be very difficult.

The United States Army wants to increase the size and scope of these exercises while simultaneously expanding

joint operations. In addition to the training benefits accrued, the U.S. Army also understands the need to justify these exercises in an era of diminishing resources. However, U.S. interests conflict directly with JGSDF concerns that increased unit participation, joint operations (with concomitant fighter-aircraft noise), and safety considerations will provoke unfavorable public and media attention. Moreover, it is becoming increasingly difficult for the JGSDF to argue for increased training requirements in the face of a decreasing Soviet threat.

Existing Problems

The difficulties confronting the future of U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground cooperation are ominous. But even under present conditions, Japanese government policies and public opinion prevent the U.S. Army and JGSDF from planning and executing effective bilateral ground training exercises. Consequently, the ability of the U.S. Army and JGSDF to effectively fight on the same battlefield must be seriously questioned.

Command and Control

One of the most serious flaws in current bilateral operations is the inability of U.S. Army and JGSDF units to task organize or form command relationships in order to effectively and efficiently synchronize the BOS (Battlefield Operating Systems). History is replete with examples of military failures due to lack of unity of command. Yet under the present circumstances, U.S. and Japanese units are not able to task organize or form OPCON (Operational Control) or attachment relationships. Unit exchanges, cross-attaching, and authorization to implement command and control authority relationships are essential to successful U.S.-Japanese coalition warfare. Attempting to command and control the battlefield bilaterally, but under separate and distinct command and control systems, has proven extremely difficult during training exercises with a cooperative OPFOR (opposing force). During the fog of battle and against an aggressive enemy, this inefficient relationship is likely to fail.

Joint Operations

Realistic and efficient joint, combined operations must be the norm, not the exception. Yet U.S. Air Force participation in U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises is limited by the JGSDF's concern over public outcries concerning noise and safety. This situation has reached

such crisis proportions that during coordination for OS 90, JGSDF limits on F-16 CAS sorties prompted the commanding general of the U.S. Fifth Air Force to write a formal letter to the chief of staff, GSO, threatening to pull out of the exercise.[3] The JASDF has also been unwilling to participate in exercises that could provoke negative public reaction that might jeopardize its future ability to train unilaterally.

Realistic Training and Risk Taking

The hard lessons the United States has learned during recent conflicts, as well as in training provided at the NTC (National Training Center) and JRTC (Joint Readiness Training Center), have strengthen the U.S. military's resolve to demand tough, realistic training. While these lessons are not lost on the JGSDF (High-ranking JGSDF officers have visited U.S. training centers), nonetheless, the present attitude of the Japanese people and government permits the JGSDF little opportunity to conduct such realistic training. Furthermore, the omnipresent Japanese media exploits examples of irregularities and safety violations by the JGSDF in training foment adverse public reactions. As long as this situation persists, the JGSDF will be incapable of upgrading the realism of its training. Moreover, under present political conditions, the JGSDF is unlikely to increase the size of its training areas

(especially in Hokkaido), which militates against the conduct of effective bilateral exercises.

Relationship to Previous Studies

Many previous studies on Japanese defense issues have centered on the broader concepts of defense in relation to Japan's overall foreign policy. Moreover, articles and books that focused on the JSDF most often addressed unilateral concerns. In instances of U.S.-Japanese bilateral involvement, the subject usually addressed defense burden-sharing issues.

Other major defense topics have focused on the subject of Japanese remilitarization. In this context, public attitudes have been examined through the means of public opinion polls. The influence of the Japanese Constitution on public attitudes has also received considerable attention.

The importance of this paper's thesis is that it correlates the specific issues encompassing U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercise cooperation to the larger problems discussed in previous research. In the process, it confirms the debilitating influence of Japanese public opinion and government policy on the efficient execution of bilateral exercises.

Suggestions for Further Research

Two possible solutions to the problems outlined in this paper bear investigation. The first is the possibility of coordinating JGSDF rotations to the U.S. Army's NTC or JRTC. While in the United States, the JGSDF unit could train bilaterally with U.S. units against a realistic OPFOR (Opposing Force). Research into this possible solution must take into account a multitude of problems, two of which, public opinion and government policies, have been enumerated in this thesis. Nonetheless, there is some precedent for overseas training (altnough these have been small in scope) in the United States by members of the JGSDF. Air defense artillery training is one example. Additionally, other SDF services, most notably the JMSDF, have participated in combined naval exercises (RIMPAC) and periodically make port calls to Hawaii. Another possibility is that the JGSDF might propose construction of a similar (NTC-type) training area in Hokkaido under the pretense of U.S. pressures for a more realistic bilateral training area.

Both of the aforementioned proposals suggest the need to cultivate greater Japanese public support for defense-related initiatives. This thesis has established that the JGSDF, JDA, and GOJ have recognized the requirement to both educate and secure the support of the Japanese people in order to pursue a stronger defensive policy.

Thus, another viable topic for further research might be an investigation of the GOJ, JDA, and JGSDF methods used to educate the Japanese pcpulace on the need for a strong, capable defense. This investigation, in addition to analyzing the effectiveness of current methods, could also explore innovative methods to improve the education process. This topic is particularly appropriate given the current changing nature of the Soviet threat in northeast Asia and the corresponding necessity for the JDA to rearticulate its defensive strategy.

Summary

U.S.-Japanese bilateral ground exercises have served to strengthen the bonds of friendship and cooperation between the U.S. Army and the JGSDF. While much progress has been achieved in bilateral exercises, the influence of Japanese public opinion and government policy has seriously limited the ability of the U.S. Army and JGSDF to train and fight bilaterally on tomorrow's battlefield. Thus, researchers and military planners should continue to explore the problems associated with such exercises to develop viable solutions that will afford the possibility for improved exercises in the future.

NOTES

Chapter 5

1. Peyton letter.
2. DOJ (1988), 170
3. Peyton letter.

APPENDIX A

APPENDIX A

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Origins of Pertinent Literature

Specific literature on the subject of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises is rare. Local Japanese newspapers and television news programs cover bilateral exercises whenever these exercises are conducted in training areas near the news agencies' coverage area. As general topics of discussion in periodicals or as editorial comments in newspapers, however, bilateral exercises are rarely discussed as separate topics.

Instead, bilateral exercises must be understood by synthesizing information from the larger context of U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation and public views on defense issues. Literature on these subjects and the general subject of Japan's reemergence as a military power are found in a variety of sources. Books, periodicals, and newspapers have focused more and more attention on the phenomenon of Japan's rebirth as a military power. This is especially true of articles published since the 1960s.

Japan is saturated with the printed and spoken word. Newspapers proliferate in the country, and Japan's total circulation is the third largest in the world. In fact, one newspaper is printed for every two persons.[1] Newspapers are the heart of the Japanese mass communication system. Editorials are freely expressed and watched closely by the Japanese government's ministers. The Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun form the largest national readership, followed by the Mainichi Shimbun. All three newspapers are excellent sources of research material.[2]

U.S. newspapers have also shown an increased interest in the issue of Japan's potential reemergence as a military power. The Los Angeles Times, New York Times, and Washington Post provide primary information sources.

Periodicals are another source of current information. The Japan Quarterly is affiliated with the Asahi Shimbun. Many articles in The Japan Quarterly are extracted from Asahi Shimbun newspaper articles. Additionally, many topics found in the editorial pages of the Asahi Shimbun are given expanded coverage and analysis in articles in The Japan Quarterly. Other periodicals that provide research materials on Japanese affairs are the Asian Survey and Far Eastern Economic Review.

A number of recently published books also provide excellent current research materials on the subject of Japan's military reemergence. Most of these books are

written by professors of international relations at various universities in Japan, the United States, and Great Britain. A few books contain works published on the basis of conferences attended by Japanese and other foreign scholars.[3] The Japanese Defense Agency publishes an annual book entitled, Defense of Japan. This book contains information on official JDA positions on security and defense issues.

Interviews also provided the writer with valuable insights. In some cases, interviewees were directly responsible for planning, coordinating, and overseeing the execution of bilateral exercises. Such was the case with the deputy chief of staff for operations, USARJ/IX Corps, Japan, who was interviewed for this study. In other cases, interviewees had knowledge and expertise regarding the evolution of bilateral exercises and negotiations necessary to initiate bilateral exercises as an extension of U.S.-Japanese bilateral cooperation.

Nonpublished sources provided key information. Most of these materials originated from working files at USARJ/IX Corps. The USARJ/IX Corps' G3 (operations and training division) and G5 (civil affairs division) were primary sources for pertinent information on bilateral exercises.

Related Literature Topics

A number of related literature topics contributed directly to this writer's interpretation of how public opinion and government policy affect the planning and execution of bilateral exercises. Even cursory examination of titles found in most Japanese bibliographies reveal a focus on one prevailing subject of the last two decades: Japan's rearmament. Japan Re-Armed, Will Japan Rearm? and Sheathing The Sword are examples of books that concentrate on the issue of Japanese rearmament under the broader concept of remilitarization.

Malcom McIntosh, University of London graduate, journalist, and author of Japan Re-Armed "wonders if the Japanese people are retaining their pacifism or returning to militarism."[4] In Will Japan Rearm?, a study of the Japanese people's attitudes toward defense, authors John Emmerson and Leonard Humphreys ask: ". . . how much, if at all, Japan should expand her military establishment. . ."[5]

Another related major topic that warrants analysis for the revelations it brings of Japanese thought on U.S.-Japanese military cooperation is the concept of autonomous defense. Makato Momoi's article, "Basic Trends in Japanese Security Policies" in The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan, talks of Japan's top priority in the 4th Defense Buildup Plan (1971) as being the creation of autonomy in Japan's

defense posture. The reason for Japan's autonomy is that it can no longer assume that military help from the United States would arrive in time.[6] This argument is echoed in successive JDA additions of Defense of Japan. Since the early 1970s, the JDA, while continuing to support the necessity for the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty, has articulated the need for Japan to develop her own ability to deter aggression. For example, the 1983 edition of Defense of Japan states: "Such a deterrent must possess sufficient capabilities to repel aggression independently or in cooperation with U.S. forces, should it occur."[7]

Perhaps the most central and important topic for the subject at hand is Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution, popularly referred to as the "peace clause." No study of Japan is possible without understanding the full legal and moral ramifications of Article 9.

Political and public debate on a number of defense-related issues is prevalent in the literature. One of these prominent issues is the 1 percent rule on defense expenditures. Another issue relates to the desirable character of the U.S.-Japanese Security Treaty. Yet another issue is the perception of external threats and the corresponding military force posture necessary to deter these threats. Necessarily, any discussion of force posturing requires articulating the JGSDF's role in safeguarding Japanese security.

Other literature sources question the capabilities of the Japanese Self-Defense Force. Particular mention is made of the JGSDF and restrictions on its training space and administrative red tape affecting it. Taketsugu Tsurutani's article, "Japan's Security, Defense Responsibilities and Capabilities," in the Spring 1981 issue of ORBIS magazine is one good example of these concerns. A political science professor from Washington State University, Dr. Tsurutani recommends "that some kind and degree of Japan-American force integration for the tactical defense of Japan be considered, particularly at the level of first-line combat operations."[8] Within Japan, the people's confidence in the JGSDF is routinely questioned.

The sharing of the defense burden and the corollary argument that Japan has been taking a free ride under the wing of U.S. military protection is another prevalent topic that is currently debated in U.S.-Japanese literature. Major arguments from the U.S. side center around inadequate Japanese defense expenditures (1 percent of Japan's GNP) that have allowed unprecedented Japanese economic growth that continues to this day. This particular argument appears to grow in proportion to the expansion of the Japanese economy. The main Japanese counterargument is that Japan, constrained by regional and domestic concerns, is doing its fair share in shouldering the defense burden. Japan argues that foreign countries do not take into

consideration the considerable constraints placed on the Japanese government by domestic and regional concerns. A 14 March 88 article in the Yomiuri Shimbun supports, with reservations, this claim. The article states that Japanese citizens believe that foreign countries do not understand Japan's position. In some cases, however, this is because Japan does not always accurately convey its options and positions to other countries.[9]

For Japan to attempt to shoulder more of the defense burden is a proposition not without risks. Japanese options are necessarily limited given the suspicions Japan's Asian neighbors would exhibit towards a remilitarized Japan. Chuma Kiyofuku, in his article, "Whose Burden Is Shared Defense?" maintains a common Japanese argument that a larger Japanese military means instability in Asia.[10]

The political turmoil surrounding defense issues is deeply entrenched in the dichotomy of views held by major Japanese political parties. In Power, Politics, and Defense, Gaston J. Sigur reflects that

> Within the political world of Japan, the major political parties, other than the LDP, do not support the SDF. In fact, they oppose these forces to a greater or lesser degree. Both the Communist and Socialist Parties state in their political propaganda and publications that the SDF, as presently constituted, should be abolished. They say that these military units serve to complement alleged U.S. imperialism in Asia. They also profess to believe that the SDF are tools of the ruling party and will be used, if need be, to keep the LDP in power against the will of the people.[11]

Additionally, there is a body of literature that subsumes many previously discussed topics found in other literature. This literature explores the growing interdependence of Japanese military strategy (although some international relationists argue Japan has not yet formulated a military strategy). Designations for the different schools of Japanese military strategic thought are varied. Michael Mochizuki, in his article, "Japan's Search for Strategy", presents four generally defined groups of thought. These groups of thought are personified by the Political Realists, the Unarmed Neutralists, the Japanese Gaullists, and the Military Realists.[12]

Literature Voids

It was mentioned earlier that numerous books, periodicals, and articles have been written on the general subjects of Japanese defense policy and strategy. Increased U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and Japanese burden sharing have been favorite topics of discussion in political circles. Likewise, articles on Japanese initiatives toward a more autonomous defense posture are beginning to surface more frequently. Literature is also prevalent that criticizes closer U.S.-Japanese military cooperation and insists that such a relationship makes Japan a puppet of U.S. foreign policy.

However, articles that specifically address how public opinion and government policy influence the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises and seriously affect U.S.-Japanese abilities to fight bilaterally have received little attention. I believe this is not because the question is unimportant; rather, it is because more interest is focused on the more basic, and to a degree, largely unanswered questions of Japanese defense policy and strategy. Since many aspects of defense are still hotly debated, other secondary questions do not receive the attention they merit.

My research investigated both the historical influence that public opinion and government policy had on Japan's defense policy evolution, as well as their influence on the military aspects of planning, coordinating, and conducting bilateral exercises. Since bilateral military cooperation is not deeply imbedded in the Japanese military tradition, the Japanese military has not been anxious to publicize these exercises for fear of unwanted attention and protest. This lack of publicity has had some influence on the dearth of specific information on the subject.

Literature Trends

In the last twenty years, the general trend in the subject of defense has evolved toward realism. Former ambassador to Japan Mike Mansfield in a speech in March 1980 sums up the general consensus on this new trend by stating: ". . . the Japanese people's attitude to the security and military problems has undergone a dramatic change in recent years to become more realistic."[13]

NOTES

Appendix A

1. Emmerson and Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm?, 110.

2. Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes," 58.

3. Robert Scalapino, "Perspectives on Modern Japanese Foreign Policy," in Foreign Policy, ix.

4. Malcolm McIntosh, Japan Re-Armed (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986), xiv.

5. Emmerson and Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm?, 3.

6. Momoi, "Basic Trends," 347.

7. DOJ (1988), 72.

8. Tsurutani, "Japan's Security," 103.

9. Hajime and Shiroyama, "Prospect," 16.

10. Kiyofuku, "Whose Burden," 18.

11. Sigur, "Power, Politics, and Defense," 19.

12. Mochizuki, "Japan's Search," 158.

13. Tomohia Sakanaka, "A New Phase of Japan's Defense Policy," Japan Quarterly 27 (October-December 1980): 461.

APPENDIX B

APPENDIX B

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Structure

Applying a methodology implies bringing structure to bear on a particular research question. The more well defined and focused a research question, the easier it is to develop a particular methodology that will structure the research, develop information, and allow for the interpretation of that information.[1]

But before a methodology can be applied, a manageable topic must be chosen that fits the time constraints of the writing situation and affords the resources for research. In addition, it is extremely useful if the topic is one of which the writer already has extensive experience. Thus, my previous experiences in the USARJ/IX Corps Exercise Division and my interest in U.S.-Japanese defense cooperation led me to choose a topic on U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises. I used an incremental process in order to refine my general thoughts on U.S.-

Japanese bilateral exercises into a concise, manageable research question.

My experiences in coordinating U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises allowed me to directly observe the many limitations on what could or could not be done during all phases of bilateral exercise planning, coordination, and execution. (These limitations were not normal training constraints.) I had served for four years in northern Germany and participated in the planning and execution of training events on German-, British-, Belgian-, and Dutch-controlled training areas. I also participated in three Reforger exercises and one Team Spirit exercise, and felt I had a good idea of those restrictions that generally applied to exercise planning and execution and those that are exceptional.

For example, I learned that it is normal to expect that in certain training areas, you may have restrictions that allow night firing only on certain nights and for certain periods of time. It is <u>not</u> normal, however, to have to seek the consensus of all towns surrounding a training area in order to conduct day firing. Furthermore, in the case of night firing, if a consensus is not reached, firing is not permitted. This example of an unusual operation constraint is only one of many that I examined in chapter 4 of this thesis.

Another problem I had in developing my research methodology was in determining and categorizing the independent variables that affected the bilateral exercises that are the focus of this study. I theorized that the dependent variable--planning and executing bilateral exercises--was influenced by certain independent variables. Isolating, characterizing, and limiting these independent variables within researchable constraints was imperative.

By discussing this issue with my thesis chairman, Colonel Joseph A. Savittiere Jr., and reanalyzing my previous bilateral experiences, I was able to isolate two independent variables that potentially shaped the planning and execution of U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises: public opinion and government policy. Further preliminary research substantiated that these variables could be both described and quantified.

Now that I had a manageable thesis, the next step was to choose a research strategy that would allow me to develop information. My particular purpose, or emphasis, was to examine public opinion and government policy in order to describe their ramifications on bilateral exercise planning and execution. In order to accomplish this, I had to assimilate, then develop and organize, essential information.

Bibliography Development

In order to develop my bibliography for this work, I broadened my baseline knowledge of literary works on my thesis question by executing a computer search and DTIC (Defense Technical Information Center) search in the Fort Leavenworth CARL (Combined Arms Research Library). My subject key word was initially "U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises." Surprisingly, no references exist under this particular key word. Consequently, I expanded my key word search to include words such as "Japanese defense policy", "remilitarization", and "Japanese foreign policy" until I compiled a few books to use as a basis for a further bibliographical search.

Concurrently, I searched periodicals for magazines that focused on northeast Asia. The Japan Quarterly was an excellent source for recent articles and also contained appropriate bibliographical comments. By systematically reviewing bibliographic entries in these books and periodicals, I efficiently expanded my bibliographical book and periodical listing.

I also investigated other possible sources of information, such as surveys, interviews, expert panels, and existing data. Realizing that USARJ/IX Corps was an

excellent source for relevant, existing data, I initiated requests for information through former colleagues in Japan.

I knew that interviews with key members of the USARJ/IX Corps staff would provide valuable information on the current status of bilateral exercise planning and execution. However, I could not travel to Japan and conduct these interviews personally, so I had to devise other methods to gather this information. Fortunately, the USARJ/IX Corps DCSOPS conducted two TDY (temporary duty) trips to Fort Leavenworth. I was able to interview him during one of these trips.

Additionally, one of my thesis committee members, LTC (Lieutenant Colonel) John Cole, traveled to Japan TDY to view bilateral CPX (command post exercise) Keen Edge. I was able to provide LTC Cole with questions and copies of the thesis outline and draft introduction chapter to take with him to Japan. I also provided LTC Cole with specific questions for key USARJ/IX Corps and USFJ (United States Forces Japan) bilateral exercise experts.

Correspondence with the U.S. Army representative attending the Japanese equivalent of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, as well as with the USARJ/IX Corps DCSHNA (deputy chief of staff for host nation activities), G5, also provided me with additional insights and a broadened perspective.

Information Development

Once I had gathered sufficient sources, I began to systematically develop the pertinent information. I evaluated the information using the criteria of reliability, sufficiency, relevancy, and currency.[2]

I determined the reliability of information by subjecting it to three questions. First, I asked if other sources could corroborate the information. Secondly, I looked at the information source--both the author and publication. Did the literature source, or author, have a particular ideological position or bias, or were they objective in their analysis? Finally, did the author write the article to inform, or rather to defend a particular viewpoint? As my research intensified, the questions of bias and prejudice took on added significance. It appeared that some leading Japanese newspapers and periodicals had obvious leanings on particular issues. Independent sources confirmed my suspicions.

For example, in their book entitled Will Japan Rearm?, John Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys conclude that

> Japanese newspapers have traditionally been antigovernment in content and many of them continue to be. On defense questions one can accurately conclude that the preponderance of editorial comment opposes the remilitarization of Japan.[3]

Masashi Nishihara, in his 1985 article, "The Japanese Central Organization of Defense", states: "Some leading daily newspapers also exploit the pacifist sentiment."[4]

Sufficiency, as I use it here, refers to the degree that the research information answers the questions posed by the thesis question.[5] To satisfy the question of sufficiency, I researched multiple sources. At the same time, I ensured that the sources were current. To ensure currency, I made certain that my bibliographical search focused on literature published after 1970. As a result, the preponderance of literary sources employed are published after 1970. Those few bibliographic sources published before 1970 were used for researching specific historical topics.

Simultaneously, I reviewed the information for relevancy. Since my thesis question was not well documented, I had to ensure that my research concentrated on information that was relevant to the two independent variables I was analyzing and to discard the rest. It was at this point that I began to focus my information.

Informational Focus

In focusing my information, I used techniques described by Colonel Gerald W. McLaughlin in his 2 October

1989 Fort Leavenworth presentation, "On Methodology."[6] Thus, I viewed my thesis question as semistructured. Public opinion polls comprised the majority of the quantitative data I assembled. My qualitative information consisted of a combination of comparative analyses and case studies.

Using comparative analysis, I first examined the relationship and influence of Japanese government policy (written as well as implied) on the larger issues of Japanese defense policy and the JGSDF. Once I established the nature of the principal relationships, I analyzed bilateral exercises as a subordinate relationship of Japan's overall defensive framework. I followed this same comparative analysis process in evaluating public opinion.

The case studies I analyzed were bilateral field exercises Orient Shield and North Wind. Although I was involved in three iterations of each exercise, the two exercises I concentrated my analysis on were Orient Shield 89 and North Wind 89. Since I was the USARJ/IX Corps project officer for these two exercise, I believed I had the most direct knowledge of associated problems during planning, coordination, and execution of these two exercises.

Methodological Concerns

I chose a methodology that I believed was the one best suited for my research question. At times, however, as I constructed and implemented my research methodology, I was confronted by uncertainty. Two of my major concerns were the influence of motives and cultural relativism.

The wording of my research question and some of my earlier statements that imply that government policy and public opinion negatively affected U.S.-Japanese bilateral exercises may lead to speculation that I had presupposed conclusions. This was not the case.

Quentin Gibson best represents my viewpoint when he states:

> Having some end in view, when conducting an enquiry, is clearly in itself in no way inconsistent with taking account of relevant facts and accepting the conclusion to which they point.[7].

Even though I intuitively felt there was some merit to my thoughts on public opinion and government policy as it affected bilateral exercises, it was only after extensive research and analysis that I was able to establish a relationship between the independent and dependent variables I had chosen.

Investigating the attitudes and behavior of a culture quite different from our own also poses inherent

difficulties. One particular difficulty is the problem of relativism. In Meaning in Culture, F. Allan Hanson writes that

> If human phenomena are intrinsically meaningful, presumably to be fully understood that meaning should be grasped internally, in its own terms, rather than according to alien criteria. But can we possibly grasp the intrinsic meaning of events in cultures radically different from our own?[8]

It was my need to understand the intrinsic factors of Japanese government and private attitudes towards defense issues that led me to investigate Japan's post-World War II remilitarization. This was especially important for me, since the United States was deeply involved in defining this process.

Although Japan has a homogeneous society, it is not devoid of other cultural influences. F. Allan Hanson adds clarity to this reasoning when he states that

> the relativism I propose contains no claim that a culture is seamless, impervious to the outside world. It is a simple fact that many of any culture's institutions are influenced by or derived from other cultures.[9]

Consequently, it was imperative that my research take into account the cultural uniqueness of Japanese society as well as U.S. influence on Japan's military reemergence.

Another challenge I faced was in analyzing public opinion. Public opinion polls are a popular quantitative

tool used to gauge public sentiment on almost any conceivable issue. However, some commentators have cast suspicion on the validity of public opinion polls. One public opinion poll critic, Donald Hellmann, argues that

> Polls in Japan give a distorted profile of opinions held by the public...The use of the results of such polls, except on the most general level of analysis, is extremely hazardous.[10]

Akio Watanabe, in his article, "Japanese Public Opinion and Foreign Affairs," espouses another consideration when he states:

> Respondents in surveys--particularly in a society such as Japan where conformity with others' views is highly valued--tend to echo as their own those opinions they have already heard expressed and defended, especially in the mass media. This fact raises the important question of the distinction between "real" and "perceived" public opinion for all who observe or are involved in the policy-formulation process.[11]

While both arguments have some validity, they do not disqualify or make less legitimate the use of public opinion polls for this thesis. I was not concerned with the overall validity of a particular numeric evaluation of public opinion on any particular defense-related subject. Rather, I was interested in general public attitudes and whether public opinion influenced the way the U.S. Army and JGSDF conducted bilateral exercises.

NOTES

Appendix B

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2. Ibid., 7.

3. Emmerson and Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm?, 111.

4. Nishihara, "Japanese Central Organization," 143-44.

5. McLaughlin, "On Methodology," 3.

6. Ibid., 9.

7. Quentin Gibson, The Logic of Social Enquiry (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 77.

8. Allan F. Hanson, Meaning in Culture (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), ix.

9. Ibid., 43.

10. Mendel, "Public Views," 177.

11. Donald Hellman, Japan and East Asia, The New International Order, (New York: Praeger University Series, 1972), 160-61.

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